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This will continue a several-sided discussion that began about a quarter century ago
with Owen Fiss's monumental THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978). Moreover this particular
Article's genesis was an amicus brief filed by Professor Douglas Laycock, another major
contributor to the discussion. My title is a play on both the Establishment of Religion
substantive topic and Laycock's obituary notice in DOUGLAS LAYcOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991). That my views lack congruence with Layeock's will be
manifest to a careful reader. However, even though our approaches may diverge, the
discrepancy is but a nuance as compared to our joint disagreement with Judge Tjoflat. Think
of two thermometers in a Midwestern winter. One says - 18, the other - 20*. Although they
disagree on detail, they concur that it is cold enough to freeze the ears off a brass monkey.
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Prologue: The AMI Problem
After a federal judge holds that an Acropolis Military Institute (AMI)
official mess-hall grace violates the Establishment Clause and grants an
injunction forbidding it, AMI's Commander orders an official parade-
ground prayer and posting of the Ten Commandments on the mess-hall
door. Fatima EI-Erian, a Muslim AMI cadet, tells her French professor
how deeply offensive these practices are. "Why don 'tyou talk to a lawyer
about getting an injunction?" her professor says.
L Introduction
After its experiment in constitutional government through courts, the
Warren Court left a legacy of reform principles for lower courts to implement
with injunctions. In desegregation litigation, Brown v. Board of Education'
"gave the injunction a special prominence."2 Injunctions also play indispens-
able roles in preventing malapportioned legislative districts3 and in the subject
of this Article, preventing improper establishments of religion.4 Today, frontal
assault and indirect incursion endanger many of the Warren Court's principles.
1. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4(1978).
3. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (stating that district court acted
properly in malapportioned district case when it ordered provisional reapportionment plan into
effect and deferred hearing on permanent injunction until provisionally reapportioned legisla-
ture had opportunity to cure defects).
4. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 206, 226 (1963)
(affirming issuance of injunctive relief against conducting readings and recitation of Lord's
Prayer in public schools).
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For opponents of the Warren Court's reforms, "the injunction has ... become
a very special target of attack."'
This Article examines what some readers may think of as a frontal assault
and others may consider an indirect incursion: Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat's
suggested alteration of the irreparable injury rule threshold for an injunction,
which he proposed in a concurring opinion in an Establishment Clause appeal.6
In a nutshell, Judge Tjoflat insisted that a judge should approve a plaintiffs
assertion of irreparable injury only when that judge can enforce the plaintiffs
proposed injunction with coercive contempt.7 If the judge's only responses to
a defendant's violation would be compensatory contempt and criminal con-
tempt, the judge should conclude that the plaintiff has an adequate non-injunc-
tive remedy and refuse to grant the injunction.8
This Article contends that Judge Tjoflat's proposal is a procedural and
remedial threat to the Warren Court's Establishment Clause legacy. Judge
Tjoflat's redefined irreparable injury rule would, in effect, erode a trial court's
ability to grant a winning plaintiff an effective remedy and confound its ability
to implement basic constitutional, statutory, and common law values.
The injunction is a substantively neutral remedy available to a court with
equity jurisdiction to protect not only a plaintiffs constitutional rights and
liberties, but also her rights under statutes and the common law of contract,
tort, and property. This Article examines lower courts' remedial implementa-
tion of the Warren Court's Establishment Clause decisions and the probable
effect of Judge Tjoflat's proposed alteration. The rule proposed for an
establishment-of-religion injunction would, if adopted, affect all plaintiffs'
requests for injunctions in the federal courts. This Article concludes that the
proposal is impropitious and would affect other constitutional, statutory, and
common law substantive areas.
The rule of law generally requires a government to have stable rules and
predictable protection for citizens' interests.9 The rule of law includes en-
forcement mechanisms, courts, procedures, and remedies to which people may
resort when necessary to vindicate their interests against official breaches, to
5. Fiss, supra note 2, at 5.
6. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1266-77 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that courts should not enter injunctions that cannot be enforced through coercive
contempt sanctions).
7. Id. at 1266 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 1269-70 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
9. LARRYALEXANDER& EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RuLEs: MORALrrY,RULES, AND
THE DIvmAS OF LAw 10-15 (2001) (arguing that authoritative settlements to prevent instabil-
ity and disagreement over rules serve interests of society); RONALD CAss, THE RULE OF LAW IN
AMERICA 7, 11-12 (2001) (exploring "principled predictability" as second element of concep-
tion of rule of law advanced by David Hume and John Adams).
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compensate them for past injuries, and to discourage or deter future injuries.
This Article focuses on the role of courts in developing stable substantive rules
and remedies to protect citizens' civil liberties. It addresses the federal courts'
institutional role in administering the Establishment Clause with injunctions
and examines the part played by an equitable doctrine commonly called the
irreparable injury rule, but also known as the inadequate remedy at law prereq-
uisite. To focus on the injunction, I have based this Article on Dean John
Jeffries's and Professor James Ryan's prediction that the substantive doctrines
in the observances branch of the Establishment Clause will be stable and
quiescent."°
Courts often articulate shared values, but sometimes their role is more
mundane - to tell an actual or potential wrongdoer what to do or what not to
do and to provide an effective enforcement mechanism. "Some people believe
with great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide with their
self-interest .... It is an important function of the legal system to induce
compliance with rules that a minority firmly believes are misguided. Legal
penalties change the balance of self-interest.... ,"
A plaintiff's successful Establishment Clause claim, leading to the
remedies this Article examines, requires the court to favor an individual plain-
tiff's constitutional claim over a statute or executive decision and to impose a
remedy on a government official. Judicial review, at the behest of an individ-
ual plaintiff, of a statute or an executive decision that represents majority will
or sentiment is an integral part of government under a written constitution. 2
Nevertheless, protecting an individual who subscribes to a minority view
strains judicial decisionmaking.
This subject requires some background. A critique of Judge Tjoflat's
suggested remeasurement of the irreparable injury rule begins with a series of
10. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 283-84 (2001) (predicting continuance of prohibition against
religious exercises in public schools). The authors predicted correctly, as it turned out, that the
Court would change the doctrine in the "funding" branch of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, _, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002) (holding that
Ohio pilot program that provided tuition for students to attend public or private school of their
choice did not violate Establishment Clause because program permitted individuals to exercise
genuine choice among public, private, secular, and religious options).
11. See Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986) (enforcing tax code
against citizens advancing frivolous arguments to justify non-payment of taxes).
12. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTrrurIONAL FOUNDATIONS, 140-68 (2002) (rejecting arguments
that judicial review comes at expense of majoritarian will and individual rights); Hon. Frank M.
Johnson, John A. Sibley Lecture: The Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches
of Government, II GA. L. REV. 455, 463-67 (1977) (discussing importance of independent
judiciary and judicial review to constitutional form of government).
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inquiries into remedy in Part IV, the plaintiff's alternative damages remedy in
Part V, the injunction and its kindred in Part VI, "play in the joints" and the
tailoring principle in Part VII, equitable discretion in Part VIII, constitutional
discretion in Part IX, and the irreparable injury rule as a prerequisite for
injunctions in Part X and its critics in Part XI. This Article's itinerary reaches
the recalibrated irreparable injury rule after discussing the irreparable injury
rule in constitutional, Part XII, and Establishment Clause, Part Xm, litigation.
How does Judge Tjoflat propose to change the irreparable injury rule? Part
XIV answers this question. The answer, however, includes a necessary detour
into contempt. How would Judge Tjoflat's proposal affect a court's ability to
protect a citizen's constitutional right to be free from improper officially-
sponsored religious activity, and would it affect the institutional role of federal
trial courts? This Article considers these issues in Part XIV. What are the
arguments against adopting the changed irreparable injury rule? Part XV
addresses this question.
Why, a constitutional scholar might ask, sully this Symposium, devoted
as it is to the pure and refined study of constitutional rights, with the humble
subject of remedy? Joseph Moskovitz observed before the Warren epoch that
often, "a deaf ear is turned to any discussion of the dry and technical subject
of judicial remedies. The problem of remedies, nevertheless, is the crucial
one, inasmuch as our procedural law is far less adequate than existing substan-
tive law."' 3
This Article also illuminates a larger point: A citizen's constitutional
liberties and the rule of law are hollow without a court and a procedural
process to vindicate them and effective remedies to implement them.'4
II The Acropolis Military Institute Problem
More detail about Fatima E1-Erian's proposed constitutional litigation
will be helpful to the reader before this Article delves more deeply into its
subject. Acropolis Military Institute (AMI) is an Acropolis state college that
follows a military-type educational regimen and styles its graduates "soldier-
citizens." AMI's unwritten litigation policy is never surrender; fight every
battle to the last legal trench.
13. Joseph Moskovilz, Comment Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L.
REV. 144, 144 (1945).
14. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights, Essentialism, and Remedial Equilibration,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (arguing that plaintiff's constitutional right is both interdepen-
dent and intertwined with her remedy).
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A plaintiff cannot formally initiate a federal constitutional lawsuit against
AMI, a state institution."5 Instead, the plaintiff must sue an individual deci-
sion maker, usually AMI's Commander, who is the equivalent of a president
at other colleges, as the named defendant. 6 Although a federal court's
injunction will lead AMI itself to begrudging compliance, qualified immunity
will insulate the named defendant himself from paying damages. 7 The
Acropolis state government defends AMI's lawsuits, so AMI finances its
resistance, in effect, by playing with Monopoly money. The free part of
AMI's game ends, however, with a plaintiff's judgment, for then AMI's
obligation to pay the fees the plaintiff s attorney accrues. 8
Although federal courts had forbidden officially-sanctioned prayers at the
federal service academies, AMI's Commander Busby established an official
mess hall grace in 1996. After a federal judge found that AMI's official grace
was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause and enjoined him from
continuing it, Commander Busby commented on the decision and initiated the
two new policies with which this Article deals:
The Supreme Court pushed women in through AMI's Stone Gate and then
it drove God out. I am going to let God back in. If AMIl's cadets cannot
say grace in the mess hall, I shall order them to say a prayer on the parade
ground before they march to the mess hall for supper. I shall also order the
dean to post the Ten Commandments prominently on the mess-hall door. 9
AMI actively recruits cadets from South Asia and the Middle East, many of
whom are not Protestants or even Christians. Our Problem's plaintiff, Fatima
El-Erian, is an American citizen and devout Muslim.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing states sovereign immunity).
16. SeeExParte Young, 209 U.S. 123,149-61 (1908) (finding that law permits enjoining
state official from taking unconstitutional action and that such injunction does not violate
Eleventh Amendment).
17. See Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619, 637 (W.D. Va. 2002) (immunizing
official from monetary damages when official violated constitutional right that was not "clearly
established"), order amended by Mellen v. Bunting, 202 F. Supp. 2d 511, 511-12 (W.D. Va.
2002).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing courts to use discretion
and grant attorney's fees to prevailing parties in certain civil rights claims); Mellen, 202 F.
Supp. 2d at 511-12 (allowing request for attorney's fees from defendant entitled to qualified
good-faith immunity defense).
19. I made this up. I disclaim responsibility for any resemblance an imaginative reader
incorrectly perceives between this fictional place and any actual academy or institute anywhere.
This is because citizens in a democracy ought to expect from military leaders a sense of who
makes binding rules and what they are, as well as a sense that the military is subordinate to




The Commander's new policies are improper under the observances
branch of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions that this Article
will review presently.2" That this doctrine is difficult to implement with
effective remedies will also become clear below.
I1 The Warren Court Establishment Clause Legacy
The Establishment Clause official-observances decisions were archetype
Warren Court innovations. The Vinson Court had applied the Establishment
Clause to the states in the 1940s in Everson21 and McCollum.22 In the early
1960s, the Warren Court decided its controversial "separationist" decisions
disapproving official religious observances, school prayer,23 and Bible-read-
ing.
2 4
The policy justifications for the Warren Court's observances decisions
suffice to persuade someone sympathetic with secular government and the
separation of church and state. Carrying forward the Framers' desire to protect
liberty of conscience,25 the official separation of religion from government
fostered by the decisions serves crucial purposes. Separation militates against
the sometimes lethal combination of religion and nationalism. In a world of
conformity and inflated government power, separation safeguards religious
nonconformity as an alternative to monolithic government institutions. Fi-
nally, separation insulates both government and religious institutions from
each other's failures and lapses. Just as religious institutions were not directly
involved in then-President Clinton's disgraceful peccadillo, the government
is not directly involved as the Catholic Church reels under self-inflicted blows
from child-molesting priests and higher officials' cover-ups.
20. See infra Part XIII.
21. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1947) (deciding that New Jersey
program to reimburse parents for transportation costs of sending children to parochial schools
did not violate Establishment Clause of First Amendment as applied to states through Four-
teenth Amendment).
22. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) (using
First and Fourteenth Amendments to invalidate practice of allowing religious representatives
to teach religious doctrine in public schools). See generally Jeffies & Ryan, supra note 10, at
281 (stating that modem Establishment Clause dates from mid-twentieth century jurisprudence).
23. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,223 (1963) (striking
down public school district's policy of requiring reading of verses from Bible and recitation of
Lord's Prayer by students as violation of Establishment Clause).
24. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424 (1962) (stating that using public school system
to encourage recitation of prayer is wholly inconsistent with Establishment Clause).
25. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 346, 398-405 (2002) (describing connection between Establishment Clause and liberty
of conscience). See generally James Q. Wilson, The Reform Islam Needs, CITY JOURNAL,
Autumn 2002, at 26 (examining origins of freedom of conscience in western civilization).
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Despite the justifications, the Warren Court's Establishment Clause
decisions are unpopular. The Establishment Clause, as defined by the Su-
preme Court and administered by lower courts, is an "elitist," or minority,
doctrine. The religion clauses, like other guarantees in the Bill of Rights,
require a court to protect an individual's civil liberties against a government
policy, the product of a political majority. Opinion-poll majorities uniformly
favor the religious observances the Court forbids.26 Religion disputes are
emotional enough to polarize public opinion and rally chanting demonstrators
to the Supreme Court's front steps.27
A constitutional right regulates relations between people; it is not an
abstraction suspended in the air. Courts respond when a political majority
uses an official observance to support the majority's religion. Constitutional
government requires people to be able to understand others' outlooks. The
Establishment Clause provides a court with a legal rule that enables it to
prevent the majority from imposing its perspective on the minority; this is a
negative way to instruct the majority to try to understand the minority's
viewpoint. Judicial review is one technique for constitutional government to
use to overcome the tendency toward conformity. The court may prevent a
majority from imposing a coerced outward show of conformity. This will
encourage pluralism and diversity by allowing a, perhaps forced, space for
nonconformity. In the short run, a judge's injunction ordering an official
defendant to cease an improper observance, ceremony, or display may not
actually persuade the majority of anything; indeed it may embitter some of the
majority and attract zealots. In addition to the injunction's attempt to com-
mand and control, however, the judicial process, including the decision and
the injunction, has an educational effect over the long run.
26. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 324 (stating polls show most citizens disagreed
with Supreme Court decisions disallowing school prayer and Bible reading). After Alabama
Chief Justice Roy Moore set up a Ten Commandments monument in the Alabama Judicial
Building, 77% of the Alabamians polled approved it. Manuel Roig-Frazia, On Trial in
Alabama, Two Icons, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2002, at Al8. Newsweek took an opinion poll
shortly after the court of appeals decision finding the phrase "under Ood" in the pledge of
allegiance to be an establishment of religion; a huge majority (87% to 9%) disagreed with
plaintiff Newdow's and the court's position on the pledge. Howard Fineman, One Nation
Under... Who?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 23, 24. Senators lined up in the Capitol hoping
to be on television reciting the full pledge and execrating the judges. See id. at 23 (describing
scene at Capitol building as senators prepared to say pledge).
27. See Charles Lane & Michael A. Fletcher, High Court Takes Up Two Big Issues:
School Vouchers and Death Penalty Spark Lively Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2002, at A6
(describing scene at Supreme Court as "[h]undreds of chanting demonstrators patrolled the




In their 2001 careful cultural-political-legal analysis of Establishment
Clause litigation, Dean Jeffries and Professor Ryan predicted stability and
quiescence in the religious observances decisions, the disputes this Article
addresses.' Even if the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine is
stable, this Article is based on the author's prediction that it will remain
unpopular and that Establishment Clause disputes will persist. People who
disagree with the Court's separationist decisions will assure that the Court's
decisions will remain controversial, triggering anger and resistance, as well
as provoking the contemporary equivalent of "Impeach Earl Warren" bill-
boards and bellicose Fourth of July speeches by ambitious politicians.29
Courts, usually beginning with federal trial judges, will implement Establish-
ment Clause plaintiffs' "separationist" position on religious observances -
"public schools should not be religious,"30 and public education "should not
play favorites."3
The observances branch of the Establishment Clause is particularly
difficult for courts to implement with a meaningful remedy. The Establish-
ment Clause sets up rules and distinctions that are impossible for citizen-
litigants, executive and legislative officials, and courts to leave alone. Many
people who have integrated religion into their daily lives do not draw fine
distinctions between private and official conduct. This researcher, examining
religious observances decisions for this Article, discerned an official presump-
tuousness in the technique and manner the majority sometimes employs to
impose its particular creed on the minority.32 Federal judges, insulated from
majority retaliation by life tenure and salary protection, should advance
28. Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 10, at 283-84 ("[T]he constitutional prohibition on
religious exercises in the public schools will remain intact."). The authors divide the Establish-
ment Clause into funding cases and observances cases and predict change in the funding cases,
which is prescient and vindicated by the Court's later decision in the voucher case, Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, _, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473
(2002) (holding that voucher portion of Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program does not violate
Establishment Clause).
29. A highlight of my family's visit to a La Crescenta, California 2002 Fourth of July
community picnic and fireworks display was a "patriotic" speech attacking the court that had
"outlawed the pledge of allegiance." The speaker advocated an amendment to the United States
Constitution to "save" the pledge.
30. Jeffries& Ryan, supra note 10, at 281.
31. Id. at290.
32. See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 483-84 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding Kentucky
state government, having "actually litigated" an almost identical prior case, was before court as
recidivist); Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293-94 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (noting
factual predicate to order: Chief Justice of Alabama Supreme Court erected "Ten Command-
ments" monument in state judicial building without notice to other justices and after having
been sued for similar practices as lower court judge).
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constitutional government by protecting minority rights; the court may find
that a statute, enacted by Congress or a state legislature, or an executive policy
is repugnant to the United States Constitution even when the statute reflects
the views of a political majority.
Lawyers and trial judges have a daunting job in making sense of the
Supreme Court's substantive Establishment Clause tests. Even a lawyer's
substantive no-brainer is difficult because many people, including Supreme
Court justices, reject the earlier decisions' basic principles. One example is
Chief Justice Rehnquist's principal opinion in 2002 in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris,33 which declined to strike down Ohio school vouchers, but did not cite
the prevailing Lemon v. Kurtzman34 test." Accordingly, the Warren Court's
Establishment Clause observances rulings have been followed, sometimes
begrudgingly; buttressed, sometimes inadvertently; and eroded, sometimes
seriously, by Burger Court and Rehnquist Court decisions.36 The substantive
observances "rules" the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts have devel-
oped under the Establishment Clause have several unfortunate features:
unstable conservative and moderate coalitions forming and dividing into
shifting majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions; constant
judicial posturing and skirmishing on the fringes and even at the center;
language that creates false hopes and uncertainty, which, in turn, breeds more
litigation; dissembling factual affidavits and testimony in the lawsuits them-
selves; spurious, specious, and implausible legal arguments; imprecise subjec-
tive tests; mind-reading and crystal-ball gazing; erroneous lower court deci-
sions; metaphors and bad analogies combined with dogmatic assertions of
revealed truth; and finally, turgid and verbose written opinions with narrow,
unsustainable distinctions.
The disputed and partially-compromised observances decisions in the
Warren Court Establishment Clause legacy still require judicial remedies. In
our Problem, Fatima's lawyer concludes that the parade ground grace and the
posted Ten Commandments do not violate the narrowly-drawn earlier injunc-
tion prohibiting grace in the mess hall. She writes Commander Busby outlin-
ing the Establishment Clause defects in the new observances and requesting
that they cease. AMI's terse reply declines the invitation. Fatima's lawyer
expects to keep the implied promise to sue. Because Fatima's substantive
rights are clear, we can turn to her potential remedy.
33. 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
34. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. Zelman v. Simmon-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, ,122 S. Ct. 2460,2473 (2002) (holding
Ohio voucher program does not violate Establishment Clause, without citing Lemon).




A "remedy," as I use the term in this Article, is what a civil court can do
on behalf of a claimant who has prevailed on the substantive legal issues. 7 A
remedy differs from the procedural path that a plaintiff's lawsuit takes through
the system and the substantive rules the court applies. This Article takes a
fluid, contextual view of a court's characterizations as remedy, procedure, and
substance; it assumes the characterization will often depend on the court's
purpose and may vary from decision to decision. There is nothing to be gained
from characterization in the abstract as remedy, procedure, or substance.
Moreover, it will often be a mistake for a court to use a characterization for
one purpose in an unrelated context.3"
For the most part, this Article examines the federal district courts, but
sometimes it will also consider state courts of general jurisdiction. The
substantive law is the United States Constitution's First Amendment Establish-
ment Clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,"39 and under that clause, the Supreme Court's decisions in obser-
vance, as opposed to funding, disputes.
A plaintiff's two basic remedies when a defendant violates her constitu-
tional rights are money damages to compensate her loss and an injunction.4°
The extensive scholarly literature about constitutional remedies concentrates
on two subjects: structural or institutional-reform injunctions and official
37. This definition of "remedy" is narrower than many found in discussions of constitu-
tional and public law remedies. The definition in the text is almost parallel to Regius Professor
of Civil Law Peter Birks's fourth definition, "'Remedy' as a right born of the order or judgment
of a court." Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16
(2000). In his 1999 Blackstone Lecture, Professor Birks attributes this definition to Blackstone.
Nevertheless he advocates the extirpation of the word "remedy" from the legal, analytical
vocabulary. Id. at 3.
38. Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1642,1667
(1992).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. The other basic category of remedy, restitution, hardly figures into constitutional
remedies at all. A successful Establishment Clause plaintiff usually will have sued the defen-
dant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and be qualified to recover her attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. Professor Mike Wells maintains that a plaintiff's recovery of attorney fees deters, but
inadequately. Mike Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68
MIss. L.J. 157, 220 (1998). Under limited circumstances, moreover, a constitutional plaintiff
may recover punitive damages. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). But with an exception
noted below, Establishment Clause defendants' misconduct has not been sufficiently aggravated
to warrant punitive damages. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing
Williams v. Brimeyer, which allowed punitive damages to plaintiff denied incoming religious
mail while in prison).
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immunity from damages.4 Judges grant structural injunctions for school
desegregation, electoral reform, and, more recently, prison conditions reme-
dies. Usually these tasks are bigger jobs than the courts typically ask of
Establishment Clause injunctions against religious observances.
An important thing to note in a discussion of constitutional remedy is
what professors call "the loose connection between public law right and public
law remedy."42 However, both Professor Daryl Levinson and Professor Tracy
Thomas are correct to conclude their respective careful discussions of right-
remedy in constitutional law by rejecting any approach that treats the plain-
tiff's remedy as subordinate; both assimilate the plaintiffs constitutional
remedy to her substantive constitutional right. 3 Similarly, Dean Jefries's
perceptive article on constitutional torts suggests that "the liability rule for
money damages should vary with the constitutional violation at hand."44
Aside from declining to subordinate remedy to right, this Article will not
dwell on the elusive and slippery distinction between right and remedy.
Clearly a plaintiff's right precedes her remedy. A court must find that the
plaintiff has or had a substantive right that the defendant violated before
moving to remedy. A plaintiff's remedy is a distinct category of her substan-
tive interest; the remedy the court grants her should advance - certainly it
ought not undermine - her substantive right. Constitutional remedies, as
defined in this Article, present somewhat different analytical issues than
constitutional rights; that a plaintiffs remedy is not congruent with her sub-
stantive right is one reason for a separate science of remedies. Instead of
41. See Myriam Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854-58, 875-79 (2001) (considering
remedial role of qualified immunity and structural reform injunctions in addressing constitu-
tional tort violations); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J.
259, 263 (2000) (arguing law of qualified immunity should be refined and rethought); Wells,
supra note 40, at 191-92 (stating that remedies for constitutional violations may require
injunctions and that damages may be indispensable, especially when harm occurred in past).
In addition, the articles cited, either by conscious choice or informally, concentrate their
discussions of damages on police officer defendants.
42. Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas
Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 517 (1999).
43. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 913-14 (stating that under theory of remedial
deterrence, "concerns about remedies routinely infiltrate rights ... remedies control the value
of constitutional rights[, and] ... rights and remedies operate as parts of a single package");
Tracy Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 673,
681-95, 747 (2001) ("[T]he remedy for constitutional rights is in fact substantive."); see also
Birks, supra note 37, at 3 (arguing categories of right and remedy overlap and that right should
prevail in terminology). Precisely to combat expansive discretion, Professor Birks has argued
that what this Article calls remedies are really rights. Id. at 15.
44. Jeffries, supra note 41, at 280.
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skirmishing on the abstract line between right and remedy, scholars could help
courts develop more precise damages measurement and injunction doctrines
for plaintiffs who prove constitutional violations." In aid of that goal, this
Article turns next to constitutional remedies, beginning with damages.
V Damages
A court will mete out damages to compensate a plaintiff for her loss due
to the defendant's violation of the substantive law. In other words, the court
seeks to put the plaintiff, so far as money can, where she would have been had
the defendant not violated her rights. A court enters a damages judgment after
the plaintiff's injury, sometimes long after, and thus substitutes the defen-
dant's money for the interest the defendant impaired. In addition, the experi-
ence of paying damages in fact, and the possible risk of paying them in the
future, will structure potential future defendants' incentives to avoid violating
potential plaintiffs' substantive interests.
One of this Article's themes is that when a defendant violates a plaintiff's
rights protected by the Establishment Clause, damages are both difficult for
the plaintiff to attain and ill-suited to fix her problem. Establishment Clause
litigation presents three damages issues wherein countervailing policies erode
the policies of compensating plaintiffs and deterring potential defendants:
official immunity, the nature of the plaintiff's injury, and the jury process.
In constitutional damages litigation, when an official defendant has
invaded a plaintiffs constitutional right, the plaintiff often cannot recover
damages because the official enjoys immunity. Protection of legitimate, but
in retrospect erroneous, official decisions is the justification for official
immunity. As a prerequisite to returning a damages verdict, the factfinder will
ask whether the defendant violated the plaintiff s "clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."'"
Did the defendant have "fair warning" that the contested practice was uncon-
stitutional? The defendant's very action need not have been held unconstitu-
tional, but its unconstitutionality must have been apparent under pre-existing
law.47 If the court sustains the immunity, the consequence is that the plain-
45. See id. (suggesting that courts should use qualified immunity to distinguish damages
from other remedies and to differentiate damages among rights).
46. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
47. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002) (stating that
unlawfulness of officials' action must be apparent in light of pre-existing law, but very act in
question need not have been specifically held unlawful for official action to be unprotected by
immunity).
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tiff's substantive claim prevails, but because the court cloaks the defendant in
immunity from damages, the plaintiff recovers nothing.4"
Immunity is a defendant's affirmative defense that advances the substan-
tive purpose of not constraining an official's discretion. Some readers might
think immunity is not precisely a remedies concept, as this Article defines that
concept. A defendant's immunity is not a defense to his liability under sub-
stantive law; nor will an immune defendant avoid the plaintiff's other reme-
dies, particularly an injunction. A defendant's successful claim of immunity
is closely related to the plaintiff's damages remedy, however, because it cuts
off a plaintiff's ability to recover her proved damages for the defendant's
proved violation. Because the defendant's successful claim of immunity
eliminates the plaintiff's damages, it is remedial in the sense that it circum-
scribes the remedies a court can employ on behalf of the plaintiff who has
prevailed under substantive law. As a practical matter, the defendant's poten-
tial or actual immunity figures heavily into the plaintiff's damages and other
remedial calculations.
Researchers will not find much Establishment Clause damages litigation
because of defendants' immunity and for other reasons that this Article dis-
cusses below. Very little scholarly literature addresses such damages litiga-
tion. The Establishment Clause defendants this Article discusses, including
our hypothetical Commander Busby, have a qualified immunity. The Com-
mander's immunity standard is whether a reasonable person would have
known that his contested practices, saying parade-ground grace and posting the
Ten Commandments, violated the Constitution.49 The immunity standard was
clear to the judge who decided one of the lawsuits on which the AMI Problem
was based; he granted partial summary judgment exonerating the defendant
who had violated the Establishment Clause from paying plaintiffs' damages.5"
A Religion Clause decision in which the plaintiff did recover damages is
Williams v. Brimeyer.51 A free exercise of religion violation occurred when a
48. See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619, 637 (W.D. Va. 2002) (finding
defendant's conduct violated Establishment Clause, but dismissing plaintiffs' claims for
damages because of qualified, good faith immunity), order amended by Mellen v. Bunting, 202
F. Supp. 2d 511, 511-12 (W.D. Va. 2002).
49. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (holding that government officials are immune from
liability when their conduct does not violate constitutional rights of which reasonable person
would have known); see also Hope, 536 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2515 (finding prison guards
entitled to immunity unless their actions violate constitutional rights that reasonable person
would recognize).
50. See Mellen, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (finding that applicable Supreme Court decisions
sufficiently unclear that reasonable official would not find clear constitutional violation from
daily supper prayers).
51. 116 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1997).
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prison mail room staff member denied delivery of incoming religious mail to
an inmate. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the inmate's
recovery of $500 in punitive damages against each of the two defendants.5 3
Dealing with the aggravated misconduct prerequisite for punitive damages, the
court said that defendants' knowing "indifference to legally binding precedent"
qualifies them for punitive damages under the "callous indifference" test. 4
The same level of misconduct would overcome the defendant's qualified
immunity for compensatory damages.55
At least one Establishment Clause plaintiff recovered compensatory
damages. In Abramson v. Anderson, 6 a high school principal authorized
prayers in assemblies and Abramson, a teacher, sued. The authorities admit-
ted that the ceremonies were improper, an admission that may have been fatal
to any claim of immunity." The trial judge awarded Abramson $300 for his
short period of shock, upset, embarrassment, and humiliation. 9 However, the
judge cited a precedent that seemed to award presumed damages for mental
distress.' He may have been applying a damages measurement standard the
Supreme Court repudiated a few years later."'
52. See Williams v. Brimeyer, 116 F.3d 351,353 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding blanket ban on
materials from Church of Jesus Christ unconstitutional).
53. See id. at 355 (finding no clear error in trial judge's damage assessment).
54. Id.; seeDANB. DOBBs,LAWOFRMEDims: DAMAoES-EQUrrY-RESTITUTION § 7.4(3),
at 344 (Practitioner Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1993) (stating that prisoner cases always have low
damages).
55. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983) (finding no substantial difference between
standards for compensatory and punitive damages). Coordination of a civil rights defendant's
misconduct threshold for punitive damages with his qualified immunity is subtle. In Smith, the
Court reasoned as follows: The punitive damages threshold is defendant's reckless disregard.
See id. at 52 (requiring that jury find defendant's conduct was reckless before awarding punitive
damages). The defendant's qualified immunity then required more than negligence, something
like recklessness. If the misconduct thresholds for punitive damages and compensatory
damages are identical, have punitive damages lost their punishment feature? No, a plaintiff who
qualifies for compensatory damages by surmounting the defendant's qualified immunity has not
automatically qualified herself for punitive damages, because punitive damages are discretion-
ary, "never awarded as of right, no matter how egregious the defendant's [mislconduct." Id.
56. 50 General Law U.S.L.W. 2462 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 20, 1982).
57. See Abramson v. Anderson, 50 General Law U.S.L.W. 2462, 2462 (S.D. Iowa Jan.
20, 1982) (describing teacher's lawsuit).
58. See id. (noting that principal acknowledged that prayers violated Constitution).
59. Id.
60. See id. (citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 660 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981)).
61. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (noting Court's rejection of "presumed
general damages" in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,263 (1978) and Memphis Cmy. Sch. Dist.
v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)).
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Williams v. Brimeyer and Abramson v. Anderson are exceptions; most
Establishment Clause plaintiffs' damages demands will founder at the immu-
nity stage.
Once a plaintiff gets past the immunity hurdle, her second difficulty in
recovering damages for a defendant's Establishment Clause violation is to
define the plaintiff's impaired interests that the damages will compensate.
Fatima will have problems defining her damages and explaining exactly how
she suffered harm.
Although Professor Feldman does not analyze a religious observances
plaintiff's injury for recovery of damages as such, he discusses the "harm"
someone suffers when, contrary to the Establishment Clause, the government
endorses religion or one particular religion.62 The majority "sends a message"
to both the majority and the nonconformist outsider: You are favored as a
first-class citizen, but you are singled out as a second-class citizen. This
distinction, he maintains, reduces "political equality."
63
Returning to AMI, in Feldman's analysis the Commander's prayer tells
Fatima EI-Erian that she cannot be a respectable member ofthe AMI polity and
thus creates or contributes to "background conditions that impede Muslims'
equal capacity to realize political lives as Muslims" and AMI cadets. 64 The
disfavored person's psychological harm actually reduces her political equality;
"the experience of political exclusion on the basis of one's religious identity
constitutes a real harm because it has practical consequences for democratic
participation.o65 "[l]t might be said [that a person's] political exclusion on the
basis of [her] religious identity is the worst sort of exclusion, comparable to
race and, perhaps, sexual identity but to little else."'
Similarly, an Establishment Clause plaintiff must possess "standing" to
sue. A plaintiff's standing requires an "injury," not analyzed for recovery of
damages as such, but as a prerequisite for injunctive redress. A plaintiff's
injury for standing purposes may emerge from self-exclusion. When an
improper establishment of religion occurs, someone who is offended may shun
62. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establish-
ment Clause, 90 CAL. L. Rav. 673, 704 (2002) (introducing argument that harm following
Establishment Clause violation is "an actual reduction in political equality").
63. See id. at 708-09 (stating Establishment Clause prevents states from impeding
political equality of religious minorities); see also Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290,
1297-98 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (considering plaintiffs' claim that Ten Commandments display in
state building injured them in sense that they feel like "outsiders").
64. Feldman supra note 62, at 708; see also Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd. ex rel.
Metoyer, 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664 (W.D. La. 2001) (finding distribution of New Testament to
Muslim students violates Establishment Clause).
65. Feldman, supra note 62, at 709 & n.1 81.
66. Id. at 716.
1358
IRREPARABILITY RESURRECTED?
public places. Thus, an improper establishment of religion may lead a member
of a religious minority to become an outcast.67
Plaintiff Michael Newdow described his eight-year-old daughter's risk of
"emotional injury" from being forced to recite the pledge of allegiance with the
inclusion of the words "under God."" But he, not the child, was the named
plaintiff, and he sought no damages, only a declaratory judgment and an
injunction.
69
Translating these nebulous, imprecise, and impalpable notions into money
damages is a formidable task. Establishment Clause violations share the
characteristics of many constitutional torts: the victim has no physical injury,
no medical expense, and no lost income. Pain and suffering premised on
physical injury or proved "trauma" do not exist. An Establishment Clause
plaintiff may recover for her emotional distress by testifying about the distress
she suffered, and her doctor or counselor may support her testimony.70 Al-
though the plaintiff did not encounter any actual loss in money, the court must
convert her testimony into money. The initial decision maker will have a large
area of discretion in granting and measuring damages.
Should a plaintiff who sues to vindicate significant public rights under the
nation's foundational document be able to recover damages measured by an
augmented compensation or a corrective justice theory? The Supreme Court's
apparently negative answer came in Carey v. Piphus7" and Memphis Commu-
nity School District v. Stachura." The Court rejected "presumed general
damages," a plaintiff's right to recover damages for the intrinsic or abstract
dignitary injury to public values when a defendant violates a plaintiffs due
process13 and free speech74  rights. The Stachura Court rejected
67. See generally Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Glassroth, 229
F. Supp. 2d at 1297-98 (considering plaintiffs' claim that Ten Commandments display in state
building injured them in sense that they feel like "outsiders").
68. Howard Fineman, War At Home: One Nafion, the Courts, and the Polls, NEWSWEEK,
July 8, 2002, at 20, 23 (explaining plaintiff's intention of protecting his eight year-old daughter
from emotional harm of being atheist outcast in room full of God-fearing children).
69. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597,601 (9th Cir. 2002), reh 'g en banc denied,
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, No. 00-16423, 2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2003).
70. See DOBBS, supra note 54, § 7.4(3), at 346 (stating that courts may award damages
based solely on plaintiff's testimony, but testimony of accredited observers such as doctors and
priests is beneficial).
71. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
72. 477 U.S. 299(1986).
73. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978) (finding that it is not reasonable to
assume every departure of procedural due process causes distress); Katzenberg v. Regents, 58
P.3d 339, 344 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting proposition that "money damages are presumptively
available unless Congress prohibits that remedy").
74. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (finding that
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noncompensatory damages based on the jury's "subjective perception of the
importance of [plaintiff's] constitutional [free speech] rights as an abstract
matter. 1
75
The Court based its reasoning on policy considerations. Responding to
the point that recovery of "presumed" general damages would deter future
constitutional violations, the majority maintained that compensatory damages
deter enough.76 Moreover, because deterrence-based measures beyond com-
pensation are undefined, they introduce caprice into the factfinder's calcula-
tions and may lead to large, arbitrary verdicts."
The Court qualified its rejection of presumed general damages in light of
the inherent value of free speech. First, a plaintiff may recover presumed
damages when her injury is "likely to have occurred but difficult to
establish.""8 Pecuniary loss seems not to be a prerequisite; the plaintiff's
emotional distress counts as an injury, but the plaintiff must present evidence
of emotional distress or pain and suffering.79 The Court's example is the
second qualification: a defendant's injury to a plaintiff's voting rights, the
franchise. When a defendant thwarts a plaintiff's right to vote, she may
recover presumed general damages for the loss of the franchise measured by
"the particular losses that the plaintiff suffered," which is "nonmonetary harm
likely to have occurred, but difficult to establish, that cannot easily be quanti-
fied" which "may roughly approximate the harm that the plaintiff has suf-
fered.""0 Professor Jean Love has written that the frustrated voter recovers
presumed general damages for intangible injuries, not for abstract depriva-
tions, which she maintained was consistent with corrective justice.81
courts should not award damages without proof of actual injury).
75. Id.
76. See id. at 310 ("Section 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate for actual
harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.").
77. See id. (finding that presumed damages would permit juries to make arbitrary awards
unrelated to actual compensation).
78. Id. at311.
79. See DOBBS, supra note 54, § 7.4(2), at 338 (noting that proof of actual injury from
a rights violation "requires something personal to the plaintiff, such as pecuniary loss, pain or
emotional distress"); Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional
Rights, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1242, 1259 (1979) (noting that the Carey Court "restricted the range
of compensable 'injuries' to pecuniary losses, such as the loss of education or employment
opportunities, and nonpecuniary losses of a personal nature, such as emotional distress").
80. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-11. But see Santana v. Registrars of Voters, 502 N.E.2d
132, 136 (Mass. 1986) ("Nominal damages are appropriate where the defendants were merely
ignorant or mistaken." (citing Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 (1814)).
81. See Jean Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in Constitutional Tort
Litigation: A Corrective Justice Perspective, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 67, 80 (1992) (recogniz-
ing that general damages may be recoverable for intangible injuries (citing Ernest J. Weinrib,
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Let's return to Fatima EI-Erian's hypothetical claim. A constitutional
plaintiff under the analysis above can recover "presumed general damages" for
injury to her franchise but not for deprivation of her due process or free
speech rights. May Fatima recover "presumed general damages" for the
defendants' breach of her right to be free of an establishment of religion?
Professor Love's sedulous analysis of the franchise versus free speech and due
process nevertheless leaves the reader somewhat confused about its applica-
tion to the Establishment Clause. When someone is denied the vote, she is
virtually certain to experience an intangible harm, but a due process-denial
victim may not even be aware of the wrong. Denial of a citizen's right to vote
thwarts her political activity, but due process denials affect a plaintiffs
procedural rights. Both victims are unable to exercise a right: to vote and to
participate in a hearing.
The basis of a plaintiff's constitutional right in a franchise case is usually
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, but sometimes the
Fifteenth Amendment. Although the substantive base may be difficult to
discern in decisions, due process is equal protection's twin in the Fourteenth
Amendment. For voting rights violations, damages are usually the plaintiffs
sole remedy because an injunction will not be feasible after the election. 2 On
the other hand, if a court finds a defective procedure to have been ineffective
in the absence of proper due process, the court's declaration or injunction will
avoid the defective process's effect on the plaintiff without massive logistic
difficulties and public disruption.
Fatima may argue for presumed general damages for nonpecuniary injury
to her right to be free of an official establishment of religion because injury
is "likely to have occurred but difficult to establish" and quantify."3 Only with
presumed general damages will compensatory damages suffice to correct the
injustice of the defendant's denial of the plaintiffs rights. Her injury is not
pecuniary, but likely; however, her lawyer will find it is difficult to prove and
whether a court would accept her argument is impossible to predict.8 4 Dam-
ages, if recovered, will be her primary remedy for past deprivations, although
an injunction will be her primary prospective remedy.
Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989))).
82. See id. at 89 (citing Justice Powell's belief that damages are only appropriate remedy).
But see Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 330 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's use of
injunction to forbid unconstitutional interference with students' rights to register to vote in
college town); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (ordering election results
set aside and calling for special election).
83. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 209, 311 (1986).
84. See Love, supra note 81, at 91 (noting that "the harm caused by a deprivation of the
right to vote satisfies Justice Powell's three criteria for an award ofpresumed damages").
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Professor Dobbs, who thinks courts should encourage citizens' exercise
of their constitutional rights, finds courts' denial of presumed damages "trou-
bling." 5 The reasons are easy to discern. Damages for a defendant's Estab-
lishment Clause violation are "more often an aspiration rather than a policy,"
and substituting a more generous recovery for the present parsimonious dam-
ages measure would emphasize deterrence of constitutional violations.8 6
Rejecting the idea that compensatory damages measured to compensate ought
to deter all the misconduct that needs deterring, Professor Wells favors "extra-
compensatory" damages - non-punitive damages when the factfinder decides
deterrence requires more than compensation."
85. DoBBs, supra note 54, § 7.4(3), at 340.
86. Doug Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L. J. 531,
665,668 (1975).
87. Mike Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 Miss.
L.J. 157, 222 (1998). Professor Wells says he thinks plaintiff should recover only for proved
harm, but at other times he sounds like he favors presumed general damages like the Court
rejected in Carey and Strachura. See also Levinson, supra note 14, at 934 n.327 (noting that
Carey v. Piphus's damages measurement ruling leads to both undercompensation and
underdeterrence).
Two other possible forms of damages recoveries exist, a statutory damages schedule and
retaliation damages. First, a few years ago, the present author suggested that Congress enact
a statute creating a schedule of minimum deterrence-based damages as a remedy for constitu-
tional violations. Rendleman, supra note 86, at 668-69 (1975). Congress has not yet taken his
advice, wise as it was.
Second is recovery for retaliation, which has virtues and problems. The school district
later discharged compensatory-damages plaintiff Abramson. See supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text (detailing Abramson decision). Abramson sued a second time alleging,
among other things, that he was discharged in retaliation for his earlier prayer lawsuit; his later
lawsuit is reported on a narrow issue several years later, with a narrow victory for Abramson
and an inconclusive remand for further proceedings. Abramson v. Council Bluffs Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 808 F.2d 1307, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987). It nevertheless raises the question of whether a
court ought to award a successful Establishment Clause plaintiff damages for retaliation. A
public employer may not fire a public employee to retaliate for his criticism of governmental
policy, in other words for being a "whistleblower." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
574 (1968). How should a court respond if a public employer discharges a public employee for
critical speech in the form of "blowing the whistle" on his employer's Establishment Clause
violation? If a plaintiff's constitutionally protected activity caused adverse employment action
in retaliation, his possible remedies include reinstatement, back pay, special damages, emotional
distress, and attorney fees. Problems accompany the benefits of "whistleblower" remedies.
Most Establishment Clause plaintiffs are private citizens, not government employees. Further,
a public-entity defendant may lack the ability to prevent private citizens from harassing an
Establishment Clause whistleblower with abusive phone calls, e-mail, and worse. A compara-
ble issue for plaintiff Fatima would arise if, after she filed her lawsuit, her fellow ANf cadets
retaliated, abused her physically or verbally, or shunned her. Should AM] be responsible for
other cadets' retaliation?
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As Joseph Moskovitz maintained in 1945, arguing for injunctive protec-
tion for constitutional rights,
Committed, as we are, to the effective protection of civil liberties, we must
label insufficient the action for damages. If the damages are to be compen-
satory, we are defeated before we start, due to the impossibility of comput-
ing in terms of money the loss occasioned by a violation of such rights as
the right to worship, or to speak freely.88
Moreover, if Fatima EI-Erian seeks to recover damages, she will encoun-
ter the defendant's constitutional right to a jury. Suppose she sues AMI's
Commander Busby in federal court and seeks a judgment for money damages
from Commander Busby for the improper parade ground prayer and posted
Ten Commandments. A plaintiff's recovery of compensatory damages is a
legal remedy, leading to a jury trial.8 9 At a trial, the Commander would have
a right to a jury to try the liability and damages issues under the Seventh
Amendment.' The jurors will be drawn from the locality and represent the
community sentiment which led to and supported the contested provision in
the first place.9" Moskovitz added to the civil liberties plaintiff's difficulties
"the varying political and social convictions of the respective juries" and the
"sharply divergent reactions to the issues raised by civil liberties cases. '
Awarding a plaintiff damages for her past injury is consistent with grant-
ing her an injunction to forestall future damages by forbidding the defendant's
misconduct in the future. Suppose Fatima seeks to recover both damages and
an injunction. "[WIhere equitable [the injunction] and legal [the damages]
claims are joined in the same action, there is a right to jury trial on the legal
claims which must not be infringed by either trying the legal issues as inciden-
tal to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue existing between
88. Moskovitz, supra note 13, at 144.
89. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,570 (1990)
("Generally, an action for money damages was 'the traditional form of relief offered in the
courts of law."' (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974))); DOBBS, supra note 54,
§ 2.6(3), at 156, 165.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
91. In Not So Far Out After All, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky discusses the negative
public and editorial reaction to the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision finding "under God" in the
pledge of allegiance to violate the Religion Clause. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not So Far Out
After All, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 7, 2002, at A12 (disapproving of verbal attacks on
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), by talk show
host Bill O'Reilly and journalist Adam Liptak in a front page New York Tiames story (citing
Adam Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y. TIMEs, Jun. 30,
2002, at Al)).
92. Moskovitz, supra note 13, at 144.
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the claims."93 The jury will decide the liability issues and the issues leading
to damages before the judge determines whether to grant a final injunction.94
Again, a plaintiff suing a defendant for an Establishment Clause violation
encounters three serious barriers to recovering any damages: the defendant's
immunity, her impalpable and difficult-to-define injury, and potential hostility
in the jury process. Thus, these barriers discourage some Establishment
Clause plaintiffs from seeking damages at all. Michael Newdow, the plaintiff-
parent who contested the phrase "under God" in the school pledge of alle-
giance, asked for an injunction but sought no damages.95 The wiser tactic,
then, may be for the plaintiff to eschew damages and seek an injunction only.
If Fatima sues for an injunction only, then Commander Busby has no right to
a jury trial.96
The defendant's violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights leads to
a damages muddle. The plaintiff's best remedial tactic may be to seek to
reduce her period of possible damages - to sue right away, moving for a
prompt interlocutory injunction, a temporary restraining order, or a prelimi-
nary injunction, either forbidding a future violation or ordering the defendant
to stop an ongoing violation. For example, two students suspended from
school following a procedure that did not comport with due process sued the
authorities promptly and moved for injunctions; the judge granted the students
interlocutory injunctions readmitting them after eight and seventeen days
respectively."7 A similar approach may either prevent AMI's Establishment
Clause violation or shorten its duration.
VT Injunction
The remedy a federal judge grants to implement a plaintiff's Establish-
ment Clause right will usually be an injunction, an equitable court order that
directs the defendant to perform or not to perform a defined activity. The
judge may tailor an injunction to the defendant and the dispute. The injunc-
tion's preventive feature contrasts to damages which substitute money for the
plaintiff's impairment after it has happened. If the defendant obeys it, an
93. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970).
94. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,479 (1962) (holding that "the legal claims
involved in the action must be determined prior to any final court determination of the respon-
dents' equitable claims").
95. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 601.
96. DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.6(3), at 156-57; FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 8.7, at 511 (5th ed. 2001).
97. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,250-51 (1978).
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injunction averts a plaintiffs future injury. If the defendant violates an
injunction or refuses to obey it, the judge may employ contempt to enforce it.
An Establishment Clause plaintiff has two alternative remedies instead
of an injunction: a writ of mandamus in a state court or a declaratory judg-
ment in either federal or state court. Although some state-court Establishment
Clause plaintiffs have sought injunctions," other state-court Establishment
Clause plaintiffs have sued for mandamus.' Generally, a court grants a
plaintiff mandamus to order "a public officer to carry out a ministerial duty
about which the [officer] had no discretion."' ° Mandamus is the equivalent
of an injunction'' without, however, an irreparable injury rule."°
A state court's writ of mandamus has both an injunction's compulsory
feature for the defendant and its preventive quality for the plaintiff. A writ of
mandamus differs somewhat from an injunction. A mandamus is coercive
relief at "common law," an extraordinary or prerogative writ issued by a court
of law, not a court of chancery or equity."3 A writ of mandamus is limited to
guiding a public official's specific ministerial functions that the court can
supervise easily. In short, the court cannot use mandamus to correct all the
misconduct the court can enjoin.
Although mandamus fits many Establishment Clause disputes, in our
Problem, Fatima and her lawyers decide to forego the risks of litigating the
98. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,42-43 (1981) (holding that Kentucky statute
requiring posting of copy of Ten Commandments violates Establishment Clause); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (deciding public school teacher's action for declaratory and
injunctive relief).
99. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,226-27 (1963)
(deciding Maryland mandamus proceeding to compel school board to rescind rule providing for
opening exercises in public schools embracing reading of Bible or recitation of Lord's Prayer);
minois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (deciding action for
mandamus to require Board of Education to adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting
religious education in all public schools in district).
100. DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.9(1), at 165.
101. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226-27 (using legal remedy of mandamus to compel school
board to act, a court sitting in equity could have achieved same result with injunction); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436 (1962) (same); McCoilum, 333 U.S. at 212 (same).
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that mandamus is a legal, as
opposed to equitable, remedy). Turning the coin over, a plaintiff who sues for an injunction
may encounter a judge who thinks that mandamus is an adequate remedy at law, thus barring
the issuance of an injunction. See Moskovitz, supra note 13, at 151 nA7 (providing examples
of cases in which mandamus is sufficient remedy).
103. Additional citations showing that mandamus is a legal remedy include: DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 13 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The
Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 81 (Summer 1993).
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Establishment Clause before an elected state-court judge 4 and, instead, sue
in federal court."°
The federal government and most states have declaratory judgment
statutes that, in a ripe controversy, allow a plaintiff to ask a judge to declare
a statute or practice contrary to the Establishment Clause."s A court's decla-
ration that a statute violates the Establishment Clause differs in a crucial way
from a court's injunction forbidding a defendant from conducting an official
ceremony in violation of the Establishment Clause: a defendant who thwarts
104. A state court has concurrent jurisdiction over Establishment Clause and other
constitutional litigation. JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.8 (3d ed. 1999);
ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER MAY, CIVMI PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 515-18 (2003);
JAMES ET AL., supra note 96, § 2.36. After competition of state adjudication and entry of a final
state judgment, the United States Supreme Court may review the state courts' resolution of any
federal question by certiorari. CHARLES WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107 (5th ed.
1994).
105. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 104, § 2.3, at 14; GENE SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIViL PROCEDURE § 24 (2d ed. 1994).
Beyond the basic treatises, the classic citation for the point that a federal court is almost
always more receptive to a constitutional plaintiff than a state court is Bert Neubome, The Myth
of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). Professor Neubome published his article, however,
on the eve of a dozen years of conservative appointments to the federal bench. These appoint-
ments were only moderately ameliorated during the following eight years. After the 2002
election, the nation seemed to be poised for more conservative federal court appointments. Neil
Lewis, Democrats Plan to Allow Confirmation of Two Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at
A20 (stating that after 2002 election, observers expect Republican majority in Senate to confirm
more conservative federal judges, including conservative religion clause scholar Professor
Michael McConnell).
Writing a quarter-century after Professor Neubome, Professor Rubenstein, focusing on
gays' and lesbians' civil rights litigation, nevertheless makes several cogent points about state
judges' receptivity to civil rights claims, generally centering on the state judges' community ties
and broader dockets. William Rubenstein, The Myth ofSuperiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599
(2000).
Constitutional litigation is not a monolith. On balance, I conclude that an Establishment
Clause plaintiff continues to be better off in federal court, most of the time. Unlike Mr.
Rubenstein's clients, Establishment Clause plaintiffs are not seekers of "equality" and "fair-
ness," but are usually iconoclasts, often literally. Moreover, Establishment Clause litigation
lacks the family-law component Professor Rubenstein stresses in gay-lesbian litigation. Finally,
a court seldom requires a lay jury to decide an Establishment Clause dispute.
A thoughtful account of the "parity" debate, which emphasizes the litigants' partisan
substantive interests, is Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal
Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991).
106. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2000) (permitting declaratory judgment actions); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Michie 2000) (same); see also DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.1(2), at 61
(discussing use of declaratory judgment proceedings to declare statutes unconstitutional).
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an injunction, but not a declaratory judgment, qualifies for the contempt
sanction.'
0 7
A constitutional plaintiff like Fatima El-Erian might consider a declara-
tory judgment for two reasons: a state or local government official may obey
a declaration without needing the threat of a sanction, and even if an official
defendant does violate an injunction, it is unlikely that the federal judge will
impose draconian contempt sanctions." Accordingly, an Establishment
Clause plaintiff who believes a declaratory judgment is the less intrusive,
more "civilized" remedy might eschew an injunction."° Furthermore, once a
judge enters a declaratory judgment, an official defendant "knows" the law;
the defendant's next violation will not be insulated from compensatory
damages by a qualified immunity, and it may even qualify the defendant for
punitive damages.110 In some disputes, moreover, a plaintiff will prefer a
declaration to an injunction because she may not need to surmount the inade-
quacy prerequisite. 1 ' In other types of disputes, if the plaintiff predicts that
a declaratory judgment will not suffice, she may use the declaration as the
foundation for an injunction with its immediate threat of sanction." 2
In our Problem, after discussing AMI's heel-dragging tradition and
Commander Busby's recent defiant remarks, Fatima E1-Erian's lawyers plan
to seek a declaratory judgment in addition to an injunction.
VI. Play in the Remedial Joints
Ubijus, ubi remedium. Where the law gives someone a right, does it also
give her a remedy?
A plaintiff who has a valid claim under substantive law has suffered
injury in the past and is suffering current harm, or will suffer imminent future
harm. A court awards damages to compensate past and unpreventable future
harm. The court's goal with an injunction is to stop the defendant's present
harm to the plaintiff and to protect her from future harm. The judge personal-
107. See Doug Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication, 78 W.
VA. L. REV. 155, 163 (1976) (noting that violation of declaratory judgment is not punishable
by contempt).
108. Id. at 168-69.
109. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 692 (1994) (issuing declaratory judgment
in Establishment Clause dispute).
110. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing standard for award of
punitive damages to constitutional plaintiffs and articulating Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51
(1983)).
111. See FED. R. CIv. P. 57.
112. Rendleman, supra note 107, at 155, 167-68.
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izes the plaintiff's substantive right and tailors the injunction to protect or
implement the plaintiff's substantive entitlement. If the defendant obeys the
injunction, it allows the plaintiff to enjoy the rights as she would have absent
the defendant's breach or threat to breach.
Chief Justice Marshall articulated the idea that a plaintiff's remedy ought
to be congruent with his substantive right. In Marbury v. Madison, 113 Mar-
shall posed the rhetorical question: "If [Marbury] has a right, and that right
has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?""' 4 "The
very essence of civil liberty," he answered himself,
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of govern-
ment is to afford that protection.... The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It
will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."
5
The Court's quotation from Blackstone is both shorter and clearer: "[W]here
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.""' 6
Examining how Chief Justice Marshall's idealistic statement played out
in Marbury's actual dispute also reveals the world of real litigation with its
second-best remedies or non-solutions. Marbury's writ was mandamus, a
practical injunction equivalent. After saying that Marbury had a "right" to the
commission he sought, the Court went on to hold, however, that he had sued
the defendant, Madison, in the wrong court under an unconstitutional
statute." 7 According to the Court's opinion, to convert his substantive right
to his commission to a practical remedy, Marbury had to sue Madison in a
court with original jurisdiction, which he had not done." 8 Professor Van
Alstyne observed that the five-year term Marbury had a right to serve expired,
and "reportedly" he "never received his commission."'" 9 Marbury's fate
113. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
114. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
115. Id. at 163.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 175.
118. Id. How did Chief Justice Marshall, who was presiding over a court lacking jurisdic-
tion to decide Marbury's lawsuit, nevertheless manage to pass on the merits of the dispute he
lacked power to adjudicate? See generally Michael Kent Curtis, History Teaching Values,
Reviewing William Nelson, Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review,
5 GREEN BAG 2D 329, 336 (2002). First, he had not been on the job long. Second, some
observers have suggested that politics may have been involved.
119. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L. J.
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illustrates the point made above: a citizen's claim to a substantive right is
empty without a court and a procedural process to vindicate it and an effective
remedy to implement it.
VII. Equitable Discretion
An idealist may insist that a judge's duty is to assure that a plaintiff's
injunction is congruent with her right under substantive law. The judge, as a
successor of a chancellor in equity, however, may grant sometimes more, and
sometimes less, of an injunction than the substantive law provides. 2 This
phenomena is called "equitable" discretion.
Later courts have often quoted Justice Douglas's statement inHecht Co.
v. Bowles: 2'
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to
do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy
and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims.
1 22
Still later courts have repeated the debate between adherents of equitable
discretion and adherents of positive law."2 The question of when a plaintiff
who successfully asserts a substantive right may not receive any remedy
continues to the present day.
"Very pretty," an astute reader might say, "but, you said above that law
consists of stable rules and courts to translate them into predictable results, so
what exactly is the law?" John Seldon's remark about equity in the middle of
the seventeenth centuy articulates the reader's fear that equitable discretion
might create the opportunity for a chancellor to be too subjective and lead him
to arbitrary decisions:
Equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that
is larger or narrower so is Equity. Tis all one as if they should make the
Standard for the measure we call a foot to be the Chancellor's foot; What
1, 13 n.24.
120. See generally DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.4(6), at 81-4 (examining need to vary
breadth of equitable relief); David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to
Replace Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1988)
(considering discretion in providing equitable relief).
121. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
122. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329-30 (1944).
123. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 329 (1982) (advocating
judicial discretion in majority opinion and statutory schemes for declaratory relief in dissent).
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an uncertain measure would this be; One Chancellor has a long foot, an-
other a short foot, a third an indifferent foot.
124
Having introduced the idealism of remedies congruent with rights and the
reality of equitable discretion, this Article turns to constitutional discretion.
IX Constitutional Discretion
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's idealistic statement in a voting rights
decision is an appropriate way to begin discussing constitutional remedies.
The court said that "the mere existence of a law, or a Constitution, without
provisions to enforce that law makes it essentially meaningless.""lH Despite
this compelling idea that a court's constitutional remedy for a defendant's
constitutional violation ought to implement the plaintiff's rights, a plaintiff s
actual remedy for a defendant's constitutional violation often falls short of the
plaintiff's substantive right.
The equitable discretion to grant or withhold an injunction for a proved
violation, that this Article discussed above, has a constitutional counterpart.
One prominent environmental scholar insisted that a judge has more discretion
to shape a plaintiff's remedy for a defendant's constitutional violation than he
has for a statutory violation: if the defendant breached a statute, he main-
tained, the judge should not refuse to grant an injunction; but if the defendant
violated the Constitution, the judge has discretion to withhold an injunction.126
The Brown Court assumed that the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctions
or equivalent orders admitting them to desegregated schools; the Problem was
not whether but when. In Brown II, the school desegregation remedies
decision, the Court commended "all deliberate speed" to the trial courts. 27
The Court's reapportionment decision in Reynolds v. Sims"2 " contains a
comparable statement.1 29 In his piece Remedies and Resistance, Professor
Paul Gewirtz maintained that courts may use gradual and partial injunctions
as remedies for a defendant's violations of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. 30
124. THE TABLE -TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Pollock ed. 1927); see Birks, supra note 37,
at 22-24 (calling discretionary remedies "a nightmare trying to be a noble dream").
125. O'Connors v. Helfgott, 481 A.2d 388,394 (R.I. 1984).
126. Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV.
524,531 (1982).
127. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301(1955).
128. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
129. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964) (stating that "equitable consider-
ations might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediate effective relief in a
legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was found
invalid").
130. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 598-606 (1983)
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Several reasons support piecemeal implementation of constitutional
rights. The first is logistical: school and election systems are large and
complex bureaucracies with lots of inertia, unable quickly to reverse course,
stop, or turn square comers.' Second, belonging to the executive branch of
government, the official defendants are not accustomed to orders from the
judicial branch, which, for its part, is not accustomed to running schools and
elections. 132 Third, state and local governments are under state sovereignty,
where federal courts are obliged to tread gently.'
Professor Farber wrote that courts' gradual-partial approach to constitu-
tional remedies is, however, based on an unspoken premise: the Constitution
does not create legal duties that officials must perform voluntarily. An offi-
cial's constitutional duties only begin when a court grants an injunction
ordering the official to respect the plaintiff's constitutional right.'34 The reality
is, in Professor Fiss's words, that "the meaning of a [constitutional] value
derives from its practical realization [in an injunction] as well as its intellectual
articulation.0
35
When an Establishment Clause plaintiff like our Problem plaintiff Fatima
succeeds, what equitable discretion will she encounter? An important decision
about a federal judge's equitable discretion in Establishment Clause injunction
litigation came in a second manifestation of Lemon v. Kurtzman. Since the
plaintiffs in Lemon had not been aggressive in seeking interlocutory injunctive
relief, the Supreme Court's definitive decision preventing government pay-
ments to church-related schools occurred after the schools had received some
payments.'36 The delay led to a second Supreme Court decision on whether the
first decision required the school authorities to refund money they had re-
(noting how immediate and complete injunctions may not provide best solution under interest
balancing approach).
131. See id. at 611 (recognizing necessity of changing all parts of school system to
accommodate injunctions and that such change takes time).
132. See id. at 618-19 (rejecting proposition that stem orders from courts would coax
school officials into immediate compliance).
133. See id. at 647-48 (noting that rights-maximizing courts sacrifice remedial effective-
ness for local autonomy).
134. See Daniel Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 403-11 (arguing that judicial remedies, including injunc-
tions, can be quite powerful for constitutional violations).
135. Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 761 (1982).
136. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 197 (1973) (indicating schools had already
entered into contracts prior to first decision).
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ceived. 137 The Court did not compel the school authorities to refund
payments.13
8
Chief Justice Burger's principal opinion held that the Chancellor's
discretion and the flexibility of equitable remedies included denying retroac-
tive application to the original Lemon decision.139 The Chief Justice's opinion,
which warrants extensive quotation below, garnered but a plurality of four in
a Court of eight; one Justice concurred in the result; three Justices dissented.14
The Chief Justice stated:
In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary
power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow .... Moreover, in
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special
blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable. "Tradition-
ally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs." 141
"In equity, as nowhere else," the plurality opinion continued, "courts eschew
rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably
involved in reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding that those inter-
ests have constitutional roots.' 1 42 Moreover, "it is well established that reli-
ance interests weigh heavily in the shaping of an appropriate equitable rem-
edy."'
43
The plurality opinion invoked the countervailing considerations that
militate against federal structural injunctions. "Federalism suggests that
federal court intervention in state judicial processes be appropriately
confined .... Likewise, federalism requires that federal injunctions unrelated
to state courts be shaped with concern and care for the responsibilities of the
executive and legislative branches of state governments."'
144
An observer having read this far may conclude that Fatima, a substantive
Establishment Clause winner, might nevertheless be turned out of court a
137. See id. (examining whether courts should apply holding of Lemon I retroactively to
payments made prior to decision).
138. See id. at 208-09 (finding that equity judge in lower court used practical remedies to
determine case).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 193.
141. Id. at 200 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (citation
omitted)).
142. Id. at 201.
143. Id. at 203.
144. Id. at 208.
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remedial loser. The Chief Justice's plurality opinion dropped a footnote,
however, that added, "This is not to say, of course, that the flexible range of
federal injunctive powers should be curtailed so as to permit state officers to
proceed with their business regardless of serious constitutional questions
concerning state legislation." 4' Protecting the integrity of the plaintiffs
Establishment Clause interest, as expressed in the footnote, appears to have set
the course for federal judges' Establishment Clause injunctive decisions. In
other words, courts that have devised plaintiffs' remedies for officials' Estab-
lishment Clause infringements have not adduced logistical difficulties, separa-
tion of powers, and federalism to justify delayed and partial relief. If lower
courts had taken the Chief Justice's implicit cue and followed a gradual-
piecemeal approach, their ability to secure minority plaintiffs' Establishment
Clause rights would have been dramatically circumscribed. No matter how
appealing the reader finds the gradual-piecemeal approach to structural injunc-
tions for desegregation and reapportionment, it is misplaced in an Establish-
ment Clause dispute like the AMI Problem.
X The Irreparable Injury Rule
In our AMI Problem, Fatima E1-Erian objects to AMI's parade-ground
grace and the posted Ten Commandments on the ground that AMI begins each
meal by violating her rights under the Establishment Clause. Her lawyer
begins to draft a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction. The
irreparable injury rule or inadequacy prerequisite is a crucial part of interlocu-
tory and permanent injunctive litigation.
The two forms of interlocutory injunction are a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction. Both require the plaintiff to show irrepa-
rable injury. The plaintiffs moving papers for a temporary restraining order
must show "immediate and irreparable injury loss or damage."' 46 The stan-
dards for a preliminary injunction all require the plaintiff to demonstrate
irreparable injury. 4
A plaintiff must show that her remedy at law is inadequate - that absent
an injunction she will endure irreparable injury. A plaintiffs complaint, after
alleging her substantive claim, ends with "a demand for judgment for the
145. Id. at 208 n.8.
146. FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b).
147. See Morton Denlow, Preliminary Injunctions: Look Before You Leap, 28 L1TIG. 8,
9-10 (2002) (describing tests for granting preliminary injunction requiring plaintiffs to show
either probability or certainty of irreparable injury).
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relief the pleader seeks."I48 As a plaintiff, if Fatima EI-Erian is seeking an
injunction, her "prayer for relief' will request the court to "permanently enjoin
the defendant." In addition, as the law now stands, the plaintiff will have the
burden of alleging in her complaint and convincing the judge that her remedy
at law is inadequate; that, without an injunction, she will suffer irreparable
injury from the defendant's violation of her rights.'49 If the plaintiff's legal
remedy is adequate, her substantive claim "succeeds," but the judge will
decline to grant her an injunction.
The present author has written that the judge will grant the plaintiff an
injunction when her remedy at law, damages, is inadequate.' But what does
"inadequate" mean? An injunction is superior to damages when: a) the
plaintiff's substantive right is too important to allow the defendant to violate
it and pay damages;15' b) the subject matter of the dispute may be unique;
or c) the plaintiff's injury may be difficult or impossible to monetize."
X. The Irreparable Injury Rule's Critics
The irreparable injury rule has been controversial.5 4 Critics have said
that a plaintiff whose substantive right, including a constitutional right, is
endangered deserves a potent preventive remedy, namely, an injunction.'
The inadequacy prerequisite, however, sets up a remedial hierarchy that
subordinates an injunction to damages, which, in turn, frustrates a judge's
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(aX3).
149. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 96, § 3.22, at 230 (noting complaint requires allegations
that monetary damages are inadequate).
150. See generally Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an
Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346,346 (1981).
151. See id. at 349-50 (finding that injunctions are appropriate when money damages will
not stop defendant's actions).
152. See id. at 352 (stating that certain "substantive interests are so basic that courts think
people deserve to enjoy them in fact").
153. See id. at 349 (discussing difficulty of assigning dollar figure to damages). See
generally DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.5(1)(2) (discussing means by which plaintiffs may assert
irreparable harm or inadequate legal remedy and requirements for adequacy test); JAMES M.
FIsCHi-, UNDERSTANDING REMEIES § 21 (1999) (discussing requirement that plaintiff must
still prove irreparable harm or inadequate legal remedy and policies behind requirement);
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 996 (1965) (examining types of
injunctions and limits to injunctive application).
154. For balanced summaries of the debate see generally DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.5(3);
FISCHER, supra note 153, § 21; Pat Vaughn, A Need for Clarity: Toward a New Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions, 68 ORE. L. REV. 839 (1989).
155. See DOBBS, supra note 54, § 2.5(3), at 93 (arguing for injunctions because task of
court is to effect social change, not economic efficiency).
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ability to let a plaintiff enjoy her constitutional right in fact instead of a money
substitute." 6 Courts ought to scuttle this practice of subordination . 57
Two powerful critics of the irreparable injury rule are Professor Owen
Fiss and Professor Douglas Laycock. Professor Fiss argued in 1978 that
courts should dispense with the inadequacy prerequisite that disfavors the
injunction. The judge should substitute a "context-specific evaluation of the
advantages and disadvantages of each form of relief' and analyze an injunc-
tion's "technical advantages and the system of power allocation that it im-
plies.""15 The judge should consider the quality and source of the plaintiff's
substantive interest; a plaintiff's extraordinary substantive claim, for example
a constitutional claim, requires an extraordinary remedy.'59
Professor Fiss rejected the assertion that people may do whatever they
want "provided they are made to pay the full costs of their action" as inconsis-
tent with liability rules."6 He maintained that courts cannot reduce rights "to
a series of propositions assuring the payment of money to the victims."''
"[C]ash payments [are] peculiarly inadequate" for a defendant's violation of
a plaintiff's constitutional rights because the inadequacy of damages stems not
merely from the difficulty of measuring the plaintiffs loss but also from the
injunction's effect, changing the defendant's behavior and the status of both
parties.'62 Fiss's stated purpose was to end the remedial hierarchy that subor-
dinates injunctions to other remedies, in other words to extirpate the irrepara-
ble injury rule. 63 His conclusion asked courts to employ structural injunc-
tions to protect particularly vulnerable citizens' constitutional rights. The end
of the hierarchy ofremedies should, he maintained, be generalized across the
substantive spectrum to the non-constitutional claims of other plaintiffs."6
156. See id. (arguing that court should determine remedy on basis of advantages and
disadvantages in each case, not hierarchy of remedies).
157. See Moskovitz, supra note 13, at 152-59 (attacking stricture on equity that is closely
related to irreparable injury rule: the maxim that "equity protects only rights of property"). The
maxim limited injunctions to protecting plaintiffs"'property" rights and prevented courts from
granting injunctions to protect plaintiffs' "personal" rights, which included almost all civil
liberties.
158. Fiss, supra note 2, at 6, 91.
159. See id. at 86, 94 (arguing for supremacy of injunctions to cure civil rights defects).
160. See id. at 75 (rejecting view of welfare economist who suggested that "a restraint on
liberty greater than that entailed in threatening to internalize the costs of an individual's action
is 'excessive'").
161. Id.
162. Id. at 87.
163. See id. at 6 (arguing that injunctions should not be disfavored remedy).
164. See id. at 91 (arguing that injunctions should not simply be placed higher on remedial
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Professor Douglas Laycock conducted a lengthy study that included an
exhaustive review of courts' decisions.161 In his scholarship published in the
Harvard Law Review" and later revised and issued as a book, 67 Laycock
concluded that although courts continue to write decisions in the language of
inadequacy and irreparability, in fact the irreparable injury rule is history.
The words irreparable and inadequacy have ceased to describe the way courts
decide disputes about injunctions.1
61
Laycock formulated the approach that he maintained reflected modem
litigation reality: The judge will grant the winning plaintiff a final injunction
to protect her interest if the plaintiff wants an injunction and demonstrates a
credible need for one; the judge may reject the plaintiff's request for an
injunction only if the plaintiff can take the defendant's damages money and
buy the equivalent of the interest. In other words, damages are an adequate
remedy only if the plaintiff can spend the money damages to buy the interest
or its equivalent.1
69
Professor Fiss and Professor Laycock tell the courts to abandon the
irreparable injury rule and, when a defendant contests a plaintiff's choice of
an injunction, to compare the costs and benefits of damages and an injunction.
The present author, although less hostile to the inadequacy prerequisite than
either Fiss or Laycock, has maintained that courts no longer take the irrepara-
ble injury rule seriously in constitutional and civil rights litigation.
170 Never-
theless, the judge's choice between damages and an injunction is more com-
plicated than previously indicated.
hierarchy, but that hierarchy should be eliminated).
165. See LAYCOCK, supra note 103, at vii (comparing 1400 cases).
166. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990). Professor Laycock had first written about this issue more than a decade earlier in his
review of Professor Fiss's TIIE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION. Douglas Laycock, Book Review,
Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1065 (1979).
167. LAYCOCK, supra note 103. For this author's review, see Rendleman, supra note 38.
For Professor Laycock's Cliff Notes summary see Laycock, supra note 103, at 53, which also
updates his earlier work and responds extensively to points made by reviewers.
168. See LAYCoCK, supra note 103, at 5 (compiling case law and finding that "Itihe
meaning of 'irreparable' and 'adequate' are constantly manipulated to achieve sensible results").
169. See id. at 266 (stating "general rule that '[A] plaintiff who has prevailed on the merits
is presumptively entitled to choose either a substitutionary or specific remedy. A court should
refuse plaintiff's choice of remedy only when countervailing interests outweigh plaintiff's
interest in the remedy he prefers."'). Countervailing interests include injunctions creating
burdens on nonparties or prior restraints on speech. Id.
170. See OWEN FtSs & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 78-79 (1984) (suggesting that
preference for injunctions reverses "traditional hierarchy" in some circumstances); Rendleman,
supra note 150, at 353 (positing that public policy can attenuate "inadequacy prerequisite").
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If AMI's parade-ground grace and posted Ten Commandments are
religious observances that violate the Establishment Clause, then every day is
a new violation of Fatima's right to be free of an establishment of religion.
AMI's violation may have a psychological effect that will persist into the
future. Damages will not be an adequate response.
A judge's decision to grant an injunction to protect interests the plaintiff
ought to be able to enjoy has five consequences: preventive relief, interlocu-
tory relief, juryless procedure, the collateral bar rule, and coercive contempt.
The judge ought to decide in favor of an injunction with these consequences
in mind:
1) Preventive relief. The judge is protecting the plaintiff's perishable
rights. To safeguard those rights, the judge grants preventive relief. An
injunction, even one to refrain, circumscribes the defendant's range of possi-
ble activity. The limits may affect the defendant's actual conduct and have a
constraining effect on the defendant.
2) Interlocutory relief. To secure interlocutory preventive relief, the
plaintiff claims an imminent or ongoing injury to an interest that she maintains
she has a right to enjoy in fact, thus she cannot be compensated with money.
Because damages are inadequate, the judge takes procedural shortcuts to
protect the plaintiff's interest quickly before a full hearing. The judge sus-
pends the usual rules of civil procedure, pleading and discovery, because of
alacrity to protect the plaintiff from interlocutory irreparable injury. Although
the irreparability-inadequacy tests for interlocutory and final injunctive relief
use the same words, the inadequacy prerequisite that the courts actually
administer for interlocutory relief is more demanding. A court may cite lack
of irreparable injury to reject an interlocutory injunction that it would be quite
likely to grant after plenary trial.
171
3) Absence of a jury. If the plaintiff's case for an injunction proceeds
through pleading and discovery to plenary trial, the judge will dispense with
the civil jury and find the facts himself. One purpose of the irreparable injury
rule-inadequacy prerequisite for an injunction is to safeguard the litigant's
right to a jury trial. 172 The decision between damages and an injunction is a
decision between a jury and a judge factfnder. Absence of a jury to adjudi-
cate an injunction is a historical accident with modem consequences. Judges,
often life-tenured federal judges, enjoin to protect minority rights and liber-
ties.
171. See Merril Lynch v. Bennert, 980 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D. Me. 1997) (finding plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that defendant's alleged solicitation of plaintiffs clients constituted
irreparable injury).
172. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539 (1970) (finding that, historically, adequacy
requirement preserved Seventh Amendment right to jury).
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4) Collateral Bar Rule. If the defendant violates the injunction and the
court charges him with criminal contempt, he cannot argue to defeat the
charge that the injunction is substantively erroneous, even that it is unconstitu-
tional.
17 3
5) Coercive contempt. The inadequacy of retroactive damages relief for
the plaintiff justifies difficult administration including coercive contempt to
enforce an injunction. Because the court has expressed the plaintiff's right to
enjoy the interest in fact, not a money substitute, the court will fine or confine
the defendant to coerce him to honor the plaintiff's rights. The court will
suspend the usual ban on imprisoning a defendant without criminal procedural
protection, and will confine the defendant to secure the plaintiff's substantive
right in fact.'
74
Coercive contempt is the chancellor's unique method of enforcing an
injunction: if the defendant disobeys or refuses to obey an injunction, then the
judge will order the recusant defendant to go to jail or to pay a daily fine until
he complies. The judge imposing coercive contempt pressures the defendant
to allow the plaintiff to enjoy her substantive right and keeps the implied
promise he made when he decided to grant the injunction rather than order
damages. Since part of the judge's decision on whether to enjoin was to
prevent the defendant from violating the plaintiff's substantive right and
paying damages, the judge will coerce the defendant to allow the plaintiff to
enjoy her rights in fact. The judge should inquire whether the plaintiff's
substantive rights are favored enough that he is willing to jail the defendant
to coerce him to allow the plaintiff to enjoy her right in fact.
As the present author observed in an earlier article:
Coercive confinement has an awesome potential for abuse. Power to
imprison is concentrated in a single trialIjudge. The usual checks against
abuse that precede criminal imprisonment, including a grand jury indict-
ment, prosecutorial discretion, ajury trial for a sentence of greater than six
months, the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the opportunity for an executive pardon, are absent before coercive
confinement begins. Contemnor is entitled to a civil form of notice and
hearing only. In contrast to criminal procedure, the judge may close the
coercive contempt hearing and seal the record. Criminal sentences are for
173. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317 (1967) (holding that the way
to challenge the constitutionality of injunction is by seeking to have it modified or dissolved,
not by disobeying it).
174. FIss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 170, at 1004 (arguing that contempt is necessary to
make injunctions work). But see Laycock, supra note 103, at 79-80 (arguing that legislatures
or courts could develop additional safeguards or limits on contempt power to curb its abuse).
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definite periods. But, in theory, if the coerced individual does not cooper-
ate, coercive confinement may never end.
.. Our system usually checks state power to deprive a citizen of liberty
by filtering it through several official bodies: a legislature passes a crini-
nal statute that defines punishable misconduct and sets a maximum period
of confinement, a prosecuting attorney decides to move forward, a jury
concludes unanimously that the authorities proved the misconduct beyond
a reasonable doubt. Coercive confinement concentrates that state power
in one judge who finds the facts and formulates predictions based on clear
and convincing evidence. As each day of coercive confinement ends, the
contemnor's day was identical to her fellow inmate's who has been con-
victed of a crime. 75
The other two forms of contempt are substitutes, confessions of failure.
Under compensatory contempt, if the defendant violated the injunction and
caused loss, the judge will order the defendant to pay what the plaintiff lost.
Since compensatory contempt is clearly a second-best solution because the
judge gives the plaintiff the damages he earlier found to be inadequate, the
judge should use compensatory contempt only when it is too late to coerce the
defendant. Like compensatory contempt, the judge will use criminal contempt
after the defendant violates the injunction. If it is too late to coerce the
defendant to obey, the judge who cannot unring the bell will use criminal
contempt, not to benefit the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant's disrespect,
to set an example, and to deter future violations.
1 76
Judges have process reasons to ration injunctions. Committing to an
injunction binds the court to preventive relief with its effect on the defen-
dant's conduct, to consideration of interlocutory preventive relief with its
procedural shortcuts if the plaintiff moves for it, to factual decisions without
a jury, and, finally, to administration of an order against a recalcitrant litigant,
including possible punishment for criminal contempt for breach of an incor-
rect injunction and coercive contempt, to secure plaintiff's right. To what
extent, if any, should courts ration injunctions? Suppose the defendant's
official observance is violating or is about to violate the plaintiff's right to be
free of an establishment of religion. Should the judge enjoin to prevent the
175. Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Termi-
nally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 190,208 (1991); see also Susan B.
Apel, CustodialParents, ChildSexualAbuse, and theLegal System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM.
U. L. REv. 491, 505 (1989) (recognizing serious constitutional concerns with power to impose
lengthy confinement with lack of procedural safeguards); David J. Harmer, Limiting Incarcera-
tionfor Civil Contempt in Child Custody Cases, 4 BYU J. PUB. L. 239,256 (1990) (same).
176. See generally Doug Rendleman, How to Enforce an Injunction, 10 LrriG. No. 2, at
23 (1983).
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defendant's breach or let the defendant breach and then attempt to compensate
the plaintiff after the injury has occurred?177 If inadequacy or irreparability
mean anything, they mean that a wrongdoer's injury to a plaintiff's constitu-
tional right or liberty is too serious an impairment of a crucial interest for a
court to countenance. Moreover, the plaintiff may not be able to recover
damages at all, and even if damages are possible, they will be difficult to
calculate. I find it difficult to think of an example when a judge should
decline to enjoin a defendant to protect a plaintiff's Establishment Clause
right or liberty.'78 A compromise that invokes equitable discretion, pragma-
tism, federalism, or separation of powers will erode, if not undermine, the
court's role of protecting individual constitutional rights against violation by
state, local, or federal executive or legislative decisionmakers.
XI The Irreparable Injury Rule in Constitutional Litigation
If the argument for delayed or diluted injunctive protection of a plain-
tiff's constitutional right is, as I have argued above, a rickety one, then what
role, if any, has the irreparable injury rule played in sorting constitutional
plaintiffs' remedies into damages and injunctive tracks?
The pre-New Deal Supreme Court may have already said that a plaintiff
who is threatened with or enduring a defendant's violation of his constitu-
tional rights lacks an adequate remedy at law. "It is also plain that there was
no adequate remedy at law for the redress of the injury, and, as the evidence
showed that the Governor's orders were an invasion under color of law of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution, the District Court did not err in
granting the injunction."' 79 If so, no one paid much attention, then or later. 80
177. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minn. Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 223
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that prevention of injury is better course when damages will be
uncertain or difficult to determine).
178. I will leave interests other than constitutional rights and liberties for later. In my
review of Professor Laycock's book, LAYCOCK, supra note 103, 1 suggested amendments to the
rules of procedure abolishing the irreparable injury rule-inadequacy prerequisite -as an element
of the claimant's claim for relief and making them an affirmative defense that would allow the
defending party to "object to personal relief on any ground that makes it less appropriate than
another remedy." Rendleman, supra note 38, at 1666. Professor Laycock commented on a draft
of this Article that a violation of the Establishment Clause does not present a meaningful test
of our differences, if any, "because the [plaintiff's] need for injunctive relief is so obvious and
great." E-mail from Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law and
Associate Dean for Research, University of Texas School of Law, to Doug Rendleman (Oct. 21,
2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 404 (1932).
180. The sentence quoted in text at footnote 179 is the last one in the Court's decision. I
ran a Keycite on this decision, and among the 319 citations, I examined the sources cited to
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The inadequacy prerequisite issue did not figure into the Warren Court's
constitutional decisions on injunctions to desegregate education and reappor-
tion legislative bodies.181 A court of appeals decision in the wake of Brown
lends support to the idea that the prerequisite played no role in constitutional
litigation. The lower court had declined to implement the plaintiffs' right to
a desegregated school. The court, said the court of appeals, will grant an
injunction
to protect and preserve basic civil rights such as these [to a desegregated
school] for which the plaintiff seeks protection. While the granting of the
injunction is within the judicial discretion of the District Judge, extensive
research has revealed no case in which it declared that ajudge has judicial
discretion by denial of an injunction to continue the deprivation of basic
human rights.1
8 2
The trial judge's decision not to enjoin was, the court held, an abuse of
discretion."3
The Rhode Island court thought the constitutional inadequacy issue was
straightforward. Damages are an inadequate remedy for defendants' mal-
apportioned districts that diluted the plaintiffs' votes: "No amount of mone-
tary damages can rectify this vote dilution, and without some type of injunc-
tive relief the harm will continue.'
1 84
The inadequacy issue in constitutional litigation came up to the Supreme
Court in 1976 in an appeal from a preliminary injunction.' As discussed
above, the standard a court will apply before granting a plaintiff a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction includes whether irreparable injury
is in the offing. 6 The federal courts have, as Professor John Leubsdorf put
it, a "dizzying diversity of formulations"'" for preliminary injunction stan-
dards, but all are variations on the following four factors: a) the plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits; b) the plaintiff's irreparable injury without
West Headnote [17]. I found nothing on the inadequacy prerequisite.
181. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585-87 (1964) (declining to consider inadequacy
prerequisite); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955) (enjoining racial discrimination
in public education without considering inadequacy prerequisite).
182. Clemons v. Bd. of Educ., 228 F.2d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 1956).
183. Id.
184. O'Connors v. Helfgott, 481 A.2d 388,394 (R.I. 1984).
185. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (Black, J.) (noting that loss of First Amend-
ment freedoms, for even minimal amounts of time, constitutes irreparable injury).
186. Denlow, supra note 147, at 8-10. As discussed above, the courts' interlocutory
injunction tests are more demanding because of the procedural shortcuts.
187. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525,
526 (1978).
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a preliminary injunction; c) a comparison of the plaintiff's injury with an
estimate of the defendant's cost or hardship from a preliminary injunction;
d) the public interest.' A federal judge considering an Establishment Clause
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction will apply a standard that
differs in the way that the factors are phrased and combined."8 9 Local varia-
tions are insignificant because the judge's important inquiry in an Establish-
ment Clause lawsuit is the first one.
In short, if an Establishment Clause plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits, most courts think that answers the other three inquiries. Turning first
to the last two, the defendant suffers no harm by ceasing to impair the plain-
tiff's Establishment Clause rights, and the public interest is congruent with
ending the defendant's unconstitutional conduct. A plaintiff's irreparable
injury follows a finding that she is likely to prevail on the merits for the
precedent and policy reasons we examine next.
In 1976 in Elrod v. Burns,"9° the Court decided that a public official's
patronage dismissal of a public employee violated that employee's First
Amendment rights to political association and belief.' Justice Brennan's
opinion also stated one of the clearest rules of irreparable injury-inadequacy.
The lawsuit reached the Supreme Court through the defendants' appeal from
a preliminary injunction based on a lower court finding of irreparable injury.
"The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,"
Justice Brennan wrote, "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."'"
When a defendant's activity threatens or impairs a plaintiff's First Amend-
ment right, the judge will grant the plaintiff an injunction to protect that right
because that plaintiff's injury is irreparable; damages are not an adequate
remedy.
193
188. See Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 109, 111-13 nn.5 & 7 (2001) (listing federal circuits' individual and varying tests
governing issuance of preliminary injunctions).
189. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799,
801 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (using four factors to determine whether to grant or deny preliminary
injunction). The third factor the judge considered was "whether granting the injunction will
cause substantial harm to others." Id. A more precise formulation would use the third factor
to focus on the defendant's cost or harm and consider non-party interests under the public
interest.
190. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
191. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (holding that "practice of patronage
dismissals is unconstitutional under First and Fourteenth Amendments"); see also Jeffries &
Ryan, supra note 10, at 283-84 (discussing impact of Elrod on political patronage in civil
service).
192. Elrod,427 U.S. at 373.
193. Justice Brennan's inadequacy point was a sideshow in the Elrod decision. The show
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The time was ripe. Justice Brennan's sentence has been a popular
citation.'94 Indeed, Justice Brennan's point is so obvious that some courts
make it without citing anything.'95
Why is a First Amendment plaintiff's irreparable injury obvious? Unlike
a worker's compensation schedule of injuries, the Bill of Rights is not a
schedule of interests that, if violated, trigger compensation. The Bill of Rights
is a charter of individual freedoms; it defines liberties people ought to be able
to enjoy in fact. If the defendant has yet to impair the plaintiff's constitutional
right, the judge should grant the plaintiff an injunction as a preventive remedy
to order the defendant to honor the plaintiff's right to enjoy her constitutional
right in fact. A person's constitutional right is socially too precious to value
in money. Moreover, loss of a constitutional right is not an injury a person
encounters in money terms; it is cumbersome for a judge or a jury to convert
a plaintiffs constitutional loss into money. Finally, once a court begins to set
the amount, a person's constitutional rights are difficult to "monetize."196 In
other words, a defendant's impairment of a plaintiffs constitutional right
qualifies for an injunction for all the major reasons any substantive right may
qualify.1" Justice Brennan's was an idea whose time had come.
The Court grounded Elrod on the First Amendment freedom of associa-
tion. Courts have generalized the Elrod Court's irreparable injury point to
speech in general. 1" Other courts have cited Elrod for defendants' violations
of plaintiffs' rights under this Article's topic, the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.199
in the main tent was the Court's decision against patronage discharges. Justice Brennan's
broadly stated principal opinion garnered only two other votes (Justices White and Marshall).
Id. at 353-73. Justices Stewart and Blackmun formed the majority by concurring more narrowly
in Justice Brennan's patronage decision without, however, mentioning irreparable injury. Id.
at 374-75 (Stewart, J., concurring). Three justices dissented on the patronage issue, also
without mentioning irreparable injury. Id. at 375-89 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). Justice Stevens
did not participate in the decision. Id. at 374.
194. When I looked at Elrod's Westlaw Keycite in March 2002, over 2500 other sources
had cited it, including several screens of cites to Headnote [25], the irreparable injury rule
headnote; a Westlaw AU.PLEs search revealed that federal courts had quoted Justice Brennan's
sentence from the prior paragraph 298 times.
195. See Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting without citation
to Elrod that unconstitutional denial of right to vote qualifies as irreparable injury).
196. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1266 (7th Cir. 1984).
197. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (detailing general circumstances under
which money damages are inadequate remedies).
198. See Olmeda v. Schneider, 889 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D.V.I. 1995) (noting that "loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury").
199. See Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1411 (D. Colo. 1998) (granting
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XIII. The Irreparable Injury Rule in Establishment Clause Litigation
In our Problem, Fatima EI-Erian's complaint alleges that the AMI Com-
mander's prayer and posting policies violate her rights under the Establish-
ment Clause. To support her motion for injunctive relief and to develop
affidavits and other evidence for the hearing on her motion for a preliminary
injunction, her lawyer still needs to learn what role the irreparable injury rule
has played in Establishment Clause decisions.
Courts have often granted injunctions or similar relief to Establishment
Clause plaintiffs without considering the inadequacy prerequisite; the Su-
preme Court and lower courts have often moved directly from deciding or
declaring that the defendant's activity breached the Establishment Clause to
granting an injunction." The trial judges in the two 2002 observances
decisions I used to develop the AMI Problem, granted injunctions without
citing the irreparable injury rule." 1 Several of the United States Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause decisions involve its review of state mandamus
proceedings, an injunction-equivalent without the irreparable injury rule.2"
preliminary injunction after finding that non-kosher food served in prison violates Free Exercise
Clause).
200. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (affirming the decision of trial judge
who moved directly from Establishment Clause to permanent injunction, without considering
irreparable injury rule), afg Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (affirming after trial court had moved directly from
Establishment Clause to injunction without considering irreparable injury rule); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (affirming court of appeals' instructions to trial judge to "issue
and enforce an injunction"), affig Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11 th Cir. 1983); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 60 (1980) (reversing Kentucky state court's approval of posting Ten
Commandments in public schools). The final reported Kentucky decision remanded to the trial
judge for a "new judgment," apparently an injunction. Stone v. Graham, 612 S.W.2d 133, 133
(Ky. 1981). See also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 227 (1963)
(affirming injunction issued by trial court preventing Bible reading in public schools), affg
Schempp v. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
201. See generally Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (granting permanent injunction to prevent display of Ten Commandments on county
courthouse); Mellen v. Bunting, 181 F. Supp. 2d 619 (W.D. Va. 2002) (granting permanent
injunction requiring Virginia Military Institute to cease daily supper prayers), order amended
by Mellen v. Bunting, 202 F. Supp. 2d 511, 511-12 (W.D. Va. 2002).
202. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,227 (1963) (ruling
that recitation of passages from Bible or Lord's Prayer in public schools violates First Amend-
ment), rev'g Murray v. Curlett, 179 A. 2d 698 (Md. 1962); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436
(1962) (determining that use of public school system to encourage recitation of prayer was
inconsistent with Establishment Clause); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 212 (1948) (reversing Illinois Supreme Court's denial of writ of mandamus requiring board
of education to terminate religious instruction by private teachers in public schools).
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To decide injunction lawsuits without the irreparable injury rule also treats the
two remedies the same.
When federal courts have discussed the inadequacy prerequisite for
Establishment Clause relief, they have often cited the Elrod rule to decide
quickly in favor of an injunction. The courts that have written Establishment
Clause decisions granting or denying plaintiffs' motions for preliminary
injunctions have usually mentioned the irreparable injury rule, for it is one of
the inquiries involved in granting a preliminary injunction. 3 Two lower
courts applied the irreparable injury test to the Establishment Clause and
dutifully checked the irreparable injury box."' One judge unwisely cobbled
the preliminary injunction standard into a permanent injunction test.2 5
The irreparable injury rule, which persisted in non-constitutional litiga-
tion, was barely discernable in the observances branch of the Establishment
Clause, as well as in other constitutional litigation. There are several reasons.
Irreparable injury seemed inevitable for an Establishment Clause
plaintiff - should the judge even ask a plaintiff opposing a school prayer to
explain why money damages would not put her where an observance-free
school would have? The plaintiff's "inadequate" non-injunction remedy
would be compensatory damages. The legal culture has not supported consti-
tutional plaintiffs who sue for money damages. First Amendment Establish-
ment Clause rights were relatively new, the Court having applied the Religion
Clauses to the states only in 1948 in Everson.2" Plaintiffs and the federal
203. I discovered a few irreparable-injury-rule Establishment-Clause decisions with
combined headnote Westlaw searches. Using Westlaw headnote searches to find decisions
dealing with both establishment of religion and irreparable injury, I searched both 92k84.5 and
92k84.1, each with 212k14, 212k15, and 212k16, for a total of six. Because of the doctrinal
subtlety and vocabulary surplus in both remedies and constitutional law, precision sometimes
eludes headnote writers. Accordingly, I then Keycited decisions on point to learn of subsequent
and related decisions. Since the federal circuits' tests for a preliminary injunction include
irreparable injury, Denlow, supra note 147, at 8, 9-10, a federal district judge granting or
denying a plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction usually makes a finding on the
irreparable injury rule, if only to check the box on the list of factors; that decision is appealable,
so the court of appeals usually also discusses the irreparable injury rule.
204. See Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding
substantial threat of irreparable injury because of threat to Ingebretsen's First Amendment
rights); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1993) (determining
that irreparable injury is demonstrated if Establishment Clause rights have been violated).
205. See Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd. ex rel. Metoyer, 171 F. Supp. 2d 653,666 (W.D.
La. 2001) (deciding that standard for determining "whether a permanent versus a preliminary
injunction issue is primarily the same").
206. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (holding that state law allowing
reimbursement for bus fares to parochial schools does not violate First Amendment made
applicable to states by Fourteenth Amendment).
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courts did not confirm and fashion the § 1983 constitutional tort to recover
damages until Monroe v. Pape in 1961.27 In Brown, the plaintiffs sued for
injunctions, not money damages.2" Such lack of materialism continues today;
the plaintiff who challenged the phrase "under God" in the pledge of alle-
giance did not seek damages.2"
As discussed above, a plaintiff's damages for a constitutional tort are
circumscribed. In a plaintiff's constitutional tort action for damages, an
official defendant may interpose a federal immunity from damages as an
affirmative defense.21 Once past immunity, the plaintiff will encounter the
difficulty of identifying her loss and measuring it.211 The Court has rejected
the alternative of "presumed damages" for violations of a plaintiff's due
process rights.212 The defendant will be entitled to a jury trial.213
A constitutional plaintiff's injunctive remedy is less circumscribed than
her damages claim. An official defendant is not immune from an injunc-
tion.214 Since the defendant's immunities militate against an Establishment
Clause plaintiff's recovery of damages, the argument that the plaintiffs legal
207. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (stating that plaintiffs may bring cause
of action against police officers for deprivation of constitutional rights), partially overruled by
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
208. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
100-01 n.53 (1999) (stating that "there is no direct evidence of what no one considered").
Under the immunities law of today and with the damages class action, the Brown defendants
would be mulcted for heavy damages. Id. at 101.
209. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
schools' use of words "under God" in pledge of allegiance and teacher-led recitations thereof
violate Establishment Clause), reh 'g en banc denied, Newdow v. U.S. Congress, No. 00-16423,
2003 WL 554742 (9th Cir. Feb. 28,2003).
210. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text (explaining that official defendants are
often immune from money damages).
211. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (explaining that plaintiff may have
difficulty identifying loss caused by constitutional violation).
212. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (stating that Supreme Court rejected
presumed damages for constitutional violation).
213. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (stating that defendants seeking
damages in constitutional violation cases have right to jury trial).
214. See Welker v. Cicerone, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("The Eleventh
Amendment provides no shield for state officials . . . when plaintiffs request prospective
injunction relief."); Fiss, supra note 2, at 90 (discussing how lack of state immunity from
injunctions led to primacy of injunctions in civil rights cases); Jeffries, supra note 208, at 110
(explaining that qualified immunity does not exist for defendants facing injunctions because
there is no danger that injunctions will deter legitimate business of government and injunctions
do not hinder evolution of law).
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or damages remedy is inadequate is strengthened.21s The constitutional
plaintiff seeking an injunction must adduce only enough "injury" to possess
"standing."216 When the plaintiff seeks only an injunction, the defendant
cannot demand a jury. 17
Procedural factors that do not preclude damages outright nevertheless
militate against a plaintiff seeking damages in constitutional litigation.
During much of the period we are examining, a plaintiff who sued in federal
court to enjoin the defendant from executing an arguably unconstitutional
state statute would have filed her lawsuit in a three-judge district court.2"
Constitutional plaintiffs brought class actions asking for injunctions, not for
damages.219 The class action was then, compared to now, under-developed.
Major amendments to class action rules in 1966 and more than three decades
of expansion in the law of complex litigation have created a damages class
action that an earlier lawyer would not even recognize.
Finally, many plaintiffs' lawyers in civil rights and civil liberties litiga-
tion have been cause oriented, as distinguished from recovery oriented.
Professor Laycock summarized an ACLU litigator's grounds for preferring an
injunction and subordinating damages:
[Clausation and quantification of damages are burdensome to litigate[,]...
there is little prospect of substantial recovery[,J... including a damage
claim profoundly irritates the judge, and... [the lawyer] could accomplish
all his social policy goals by injunction. Consequently, [such a lawyer]
always tried to talk his clients out of asking for damages, and he thought
this was a widespread practice among civil liberties litigators.220
Up to this point, our AMI Problem's Fatima EI-Erian's real-life re-
searcher could declare the irreparable injury rule lifeless in religious obser-
vances litigation, leaving neither mourners nor legacies. If the Establishment
215. See Leubsdorf, supra note 187, at 542 (explaining that defendant's sovereign
immunity means plaintiff's potential loss is irreparable).
216. Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471,478 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[Wle conclude that the plaintiffs
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. We also find that this injury is plainly caused by one
defendant's statutory directive to erect the Ten Commandments and that an injunction can
redress plaintiff's injury. Thus, we are satisfied that the individual plaintiffs had standing to
pursue this action in the district court.").
217. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (stating that defendants in constitu-
tional violation cases have right to jury trial when plaintiff demands money damages).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1976) (repealed 1994) (requiring that three-judge district court
hear all actions for permanent injunctions restraining enforcement of unconstitutional statute).
219. See Fss, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing emergence of Rule 23(bX2) class actions for
injunctions instead of Rule 23 (bX3) damages actions).
220. Laycock, supra note 103, at 63-64.
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Clause has been bereft of irreparable injury rule interest, is the irreparable
injury rule truly dead? Or was it merely dormant?
XV Judge Tjoflat Resurrects the Irreparable Injury Rule
In 1999, concurring in Chandler v. James,22' Judge Tjoflat asserted that
courts should redefine the irreparable injury rule to ration injunctions even
more than they do.222 Chandler was one of the high school religious obser-
vances cases before Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.223 While
no court has adopted Judge Tjoflat's restatement, no court seems to have
repudiated it.
Judge Tjoflat suggests an altered metric for the irreparable injury rule.
Before granting the plaintiff an injunction, the judge should anticipate
whether the injunction the plaintiff proposes will have, if the defendant
violates it, a potential for coercive contempt enforcement. 24 If the plaintiff's
proposed injunction lacks coercive-contempt potential, the judge should deny
it. "[A] court should not enter an injunction that cannot be enforced through
coercive contempt sanctions. 225
Two overarching policies support Judge Tjoflat's proposal: "[E]quity
will not intervene where there is an adequate remedy at law," is the first. 26
The inadequacy prerequisite protects the defendant's procedural rights.
Second is "the constitutional principle of separation of powers."227
Judge Tjoflat has a substantive agenda - courts have "abused" the "im-
portant" injunctive remedy, a practice that the altered irreparable injury rule
will curb.22' This Article deals with the irreparable injury rule and coercive
contempt, two procedure-remedies subjects with which many constitutional
specialists may be less than completely familiar. The irreparable injury rule
has been treated above. For an understanding of Judge Tjoflat's altered
221. 180 F.3d 1254 (1 lth Cir. 1999).
222. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1266-77 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that courts should issue injunctions only if they can be enforced through coercive
contempt sanctions).
223. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Whether a successful Establishment Clause plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law was briefed for the en bane Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
inAdler v. Duvall County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1065 (2001). The en bane court decided for defendants, and so it did not reach the
adequacy-inadequacy issue. Id. at 1343.
224. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1266 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
225. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
226. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
227. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 1277 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
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irreparable injury rule, the following explanation of the basic distinctions in
contempt seems necessary.229
Suppose that Polin and Danials dispute who owns an 1803 edition of
Tucker's Blackstone, which is rare enough for a judge to consider "unique."
230
Polin, who has it, sues Danials, asking the court for a declaratory judgment of
ownership and an injunction forbidding Danials from interfering with his
possession. The judge declares that Polin owns the work and, finding damages
inadequate, enjoins Danials not to disrupt Polin's quiet possession. Damals,
in defiance, spirits the books away.
The legal system has three types of consequences for Danials's miscon-
duct: a) the criminal law, larceny; b) the tort law, conversion; and c) the
contempt power, for disobeying a court order. The law further divides con-
tempt, in its turn, into three categories: a) criminal contempt, b) compensatory
contempt, and c) coercive contempt. The three contempt remedies against
Danials roughly parallel the legal system's consequences in the first sentence.
First, the judge may find Danials in criminal contempt and fine her $5000.
The judge's criminal contempt sanction is determinate and irrevocable; its
twofold purpose is to deter Danials and others from thwarting court orders and
to punish her for disrespect of the court order. Criminal contempt resembles
a criminal law sanction for larceny.
Compensatory contempt is Polin's second contempt remedy.23 It resem-
bles a property owner's damages action for conversion. The judge may enter
a compensatory contempt judgment against Danials ordering her to pay Polin
for the harm she caused him by disobeying the injunction. The judge may
measure plaintiff Polin's compensatory contempt recovery by the value of the
books on the date of the wrong and add the plaintiff's cost of enforcing the
injunction including attorney's fees and costs.
The judge's intent with a compensatory contempt award is to restore the
plaintiff's loss, so much as money can, and to make a plaintiff's enforcement
costless. However, a minority of states, led by California, reject compensatory
229. I have updated and rewritten the following paragraphs from Rendleman, supra note
176, at 24-25. Judge Tjoflat discusses the chancellor's contempt sanctions. Chandler v. James,
180 F.3d 1254, 1266-68 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
230. See generally Davison Douglas, The Jeffersonian Vision of Legal Education, 51 J.
LEoAL EDuC. 185, 204 (2001) (giving brief history of creation and publication of Tucker's
Blackstone). Washington and Lee's set of Tucker's Blackstone is under lock and key in the
library's rare book room. I did not discover a set of Tucker's 1803 Blackstone for sale with an
internet rare-law-book search in late 2001 and early 2002.
231. See generally Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiffs Remedy When
Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L. REV. 971 (articulating doctrines, issues, and
stages of compensatory contempt proceedings).
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contempt; those states remit an injunction plaintiff to a second action for
damages against the injunction breacher.12
The plaintiffs third contempt remedy is coercive contempt.1 3 If Danials
refuses to return the books or to disclose its location to the judge, the judge
might say, "I fine you $100 per day until you return the Tucker's Blackstone
or tell where it is." Criminal contempt and compensatory contempt are analo-
gous, respectively, to the criminal law and the conversion tort for money;
coercive contempt is distinctive to injunctions and personal orders.
Coercive contempt's parallel is to the original injunction, which the judge
had granted because plaintiff Polin's damages remedy was inadequate. Polin's
injunction protects his right to enjoy his substantive right in fact. If Danials
violates the injunction, the judge will wield coercive contempt because a
monetary recovery for Polin continues to be inadequate. The judge's goal with
coercive contempt is to secure the conduct from Danials to which Polin is
entitled. A coercive contempt order is a revocable, indeterminate threat. If
Danials complies, the judge's coercive threat never starts or, having started,
ends. Thus, when the judge announces his measures, coercive contempt
resembles a second injunction with the penalty for breach specified.
Turning again to the distinction between civil contempt and criminal
contempt, compensatory contempt and coercive contempt comprise civil
contempt; criminal contempt is, obviously, criminal. The consequences of the
civil contempt-criminal contempt characterization, although mostly proce-
dural, are critically important. Coercive contempt and compensatory contempt
follow civil procedure, with two refinements: There will be no jury, and the
proponent's burden of proof is usually clear and convincing evidence." 4 On
the other hand, criminal contempt requires criminal procedure; except for an
indictment, a criminal contemnor may claim a full panoply of criminal proce-
dural protections, including a jury for a "serious" criminal sentence."
Another way to classify contempt is retrospective-prospective.236 Crimi-
nal contempt and compensatory contempt are the two forms of retrospective,
232. See Safer v. Super. Ct., 540 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1975) (declaring that California has no
provisions allowing for compensatory contempt).
233. See generally FIss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 170 (giving broad overview of policies
behind coercive contempt and methods of enforcement).
234. See, e.g., Vt. Women's Health Ctr. v. Operation Rescue, 617 A.2d 411, 414 (Vt.
1992) ("We first set out the standards for review of contempt orders. It is plaintiffs' burden to
prove the elements of civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence.").
235. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1968) (holding that jury trial provisions
of Constitution apply to criminal contempt cases).
236. See, e.g., Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 545 F.2d 1336, 1344 (3d
Cir. 1976) (distinguishing between compensatory contempt and coercive contempt on ground
that compensatory contempt is "backward-looking" while coercive looks "to the future").
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or backward-looking, contempt. Retrospective criminal and compensatory
contempt confesses failure. Because damages do not adequately protect
Polin's right to the Blackstone, the judge enjoined Danials to assure Polin's
enjoyment of the rights in fact. But Danials breached the injunction; the judge
can no longer secure from Danials the conduct to which Polin is entitled. The
judge substitutes money recovery, compensatory contempt, or punishes
Danials, criminal contempt.
Compensatory contempt includes an additional irony because it is too late
to achieve Danials's obedience that Polin rightfully expected: the judge must
employ the backward-looking money recovery to advance, or at least not
retard, the initial decision that money would be an inadequate remedy to
protect Polin's interest.
Coercive contempt is the prospective, future-oriented contempt the judge
uses to achieve the defendant's obedience; it is inextricably related to the
prerequisite for an injunction that money is an inadequate solution to secure
the plaintiff's substantive interest. When the judge grants the injunction Polin
requested, the judge and the legal system commit to securing Polin's substan-
tive right through Danials's obedience. After Danials breaches the injunction,
the judge fashions a forward-looking coercive contempt plan to enforce the
inadequacy prerequisite. A judge will use coercive contempt to structure the
defendant's incentives and to modify the defendant's behavior to allow the
plaintiff to enjoy her rights in fact, rather than a money substitute.23
Injunctions and coercive contempt are command and control devices.
The judge's coercive contempt tools are blunt threats to fine or to imprison the
defendant. Coercive contempt measures vary from gentle to severe. The
judge may threaten to fine Danials $100 per day and the threat may work -
Danials may turn over Tucker's Blackstone right away and the threatened fine
will never start. An observer may find it difficult to distinguish a coercive
contempt threat from an injunction because, when the judge announces it,
coercive contempt resembles a second injunction with the penalty for breach
specified.
On the other hand, there may be no upper limit except the judge's credi-
bility to constrain coercive contempt. To achieve Danials's compliance, the
judge may make threats he would hesitate to carry out. Suppose the judge
tells Danials to cool her heels in the county jail until she tells the court where
to find the Blackstone. A judge's coercive threat should exceed a projected
potential compensatory award because the judge intends the threat to obviate
the defendant's breach leading to compensatory contempt. Similarly, a
237. See FIss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 170, at 1004-06 (describing coercive contempt
and distinguishing coercive contempt from criminal and compensatory contempt).
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judge's coercive threat may exceed a projected potential criminal contempt
sanction because if the coercive threat works, the court will not deploy the
criminal sanction."
A judge who tells Danials, "You have the jail keys in your pocket,"
means that Danials's coercive confinement in jail is incremental; Danials
controls whether confinement will ever start and, if it starts, how long it will
last. If the $100 daily fine fails to produce the Blackstone in a fortnight, the
judge may also order imprisonment of Danials to quicken her conscience and
to jar her memory. If she is obdurate, she may find herself still under confine-
ment two years later. Coercive contempt inherently harbors the potential to
overreach. A single trial judge, who issued the injunction in the first place,
and who may be caught up emotionally in the defendant's dance of defiance,
exercises the power to imprison the defendant (perhaps indefinitely) with
neither a jury nor any of the checks that usually precede imprisonment.239
The following summarizes Judge Tjoflat's position. After explaining the
three forms of contempt sanction, he brings together the type of injunction, the
nature of the defendant's violation, and the type of contempt sanction.24° He
classifies two types of injunctions, "an injunction that commands the perfor-
mance of a specific act" and one "that forbids the performance of a specific
act. "' This is the familiar distinction between a mandatory and a prohibitory
injunction.
24 2
If, despite an injunction that commands the defendant to "shut down the
mill," it "continues to operate" the plant, then the judge may impose all three
forms of contempt, to compensate the plaintiff for injury during the violation,
to punish the defendant for flouting the order, and to coerce the defendant to
obey in the future by imposing confinement or a daily fine.
243
238. See THOMAS SCHELUNG, THE STRATEGYOFCONFLiCT35 (2d ed. 1980) (notingthreats
are "designed to impress on the other the automatic consequences of his act").
239. See Margaret Meriwether Corday, Contempt Sanctions and the Excess Fines Clause,
76 N.C. L. REv. 407, 414 (1998) (stating that "the potential for abuse [inherent to coercive
contempt] stems from the fact that, in this one area, legislative, executive, and judicial powers
are joined"); supra note 175 and accompanying text (noting coercive confinement's "awesome
potential for abuse"); see also Chadwick v. Janecka, 302 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
that state court's denial of habeas corpus petition to contemnor confined indefinitely for period
then totaling, so far, seven years was not unreasonable application of federal law).
240. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1268-75 (11 th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concur-
ring) (formulating irreparable injury rule).
241. Id. at 1268 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
242. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 153, at 1061-63 (discussing the
mandatory-prohibitory distinction).
243. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1269-70 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (outlining available sanctions
for prohibitory and mandatory injunctions).
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Judge Tjoflat contrasts the sanctions available for violation of a prohibi-
tory injunction. "[W]hen an injunction forbids the performance of an act,
coercive sanctions are not available to enforce the injunction." '244 For Judge
Tjoflat, that is the problem with the present approach to the irreparable injury
rule and contempt. Compensatory contempt duplicates the plaintiffs action
"at common law" for compensatory money damages, and criminal contempt
duplicates the government's criminal prosecution under the usual criminal
statutes.245 For Judge Tjoflat, the plaintiff's damages action and the govern-
ment's garden-variety criminal prosecution are adequate remedies at law.
Thus, if at the time the plaintiff requests an injunction, the judge anticipates
that the only sanction for a future violation might be compensatory contempt
and criminal contempt, the judge should decline to enjoin. "Only injunctions
enforceable through coercive sanctions provide a form of relief that is unique
to equity. They are therefore," Judge Tjoflat concludes, "the only type of
injunctions that courts should enter, on the basis of the rule that injunctions
should not be granted where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law." '246
In short, under Judge Tjoflat's restated test, a court should not use the
prohibitory or. "don't" injunction because the judge could not enforce it with
coercive contempt. A judge may only enter an injunction that commands
affirmative conduct, conduct that the court can coerce the defendant into
performing.
Furthermore, an injunction the violation of which the judge can only
sanction through compensatory contempt and criminal contempt "has the
potential to run afoul of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers." 4 '
If the anticipated injunction is a legal duty established in a statute, "the
legislature is likely also to have created rules regarding the means by which
the law should be enforced and the appropriate sanction for a violation of the
law.""24 If an injunction forbids the defendant from doing something that
would be a tort absent the injunction, the defendant would be entitled to a
civil jury in the civil tort action for damages, but in most states not in compen-
satory contempt.249 If the judge pursues criminal contempt, that solution
244. Id. at 1269 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
245. See id. at 1270 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (noting deterrent is equally available to
plaintiff through action for damages).
246. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 1271 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
248. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
249. See Rendleman, supra note 231, at 982-85 (noting majority of states maintain
compensatory contempt without jury because judge's enjoining power stems from equity).
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erodes the executive's prerogative to enforce the criminal law and converts
activity Congress has not made criminal into a crime.25°
When a plaintiff requests an injunction, the judge "should consider how
the requested injunction is to be enforced. If the injunction cannot be en-
forced using coercive sanctions, then it should not be entered.""2  There are
refinements, but the foregoing is the gist of Judge Tjoflat's argument.
Judge Tjoflat adduced reasons for his restated irreparable injury rule.
Criminal contempt for violation of an injunction duplicates a criminal prose-
cution under the usual criminal statutes.252 The legislature defines crimes.253
A criminal defendant has the right to a jury.254 Compensatory contempt
duplicates a civil damages action and the legislature establishes criteria for
civil recovery.2 5 The judge's reasons can be put under the heads of separa-
tion of powers and due process.
The plaintiff, under Judge Tjoflat's analysis, has an adequate remedy at
law: if official observances violate her Establishment Clause rights, the
plaintiff can sue AMI's Commander for damages under familiar constitutional
tort principles. 5 6 The federal government may prosecute criminally." 7 The
sequence - injunction, violation, criminal contempt and compensatory con-
tempt - would subordinate the Commander's procedural right to a civil jury
and interfere with the prerogatives of both Congress and the federal prosecut-
ing authorities.
258
Judge Tjoflat had two important insights. First the injunction-contempt
process concentrates significant power in the trial judge. Second, coercive
contempt is related to the irreparable injury rule: the judge coerces the
250. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254,1272 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concurring)
(stating that use of criminal contempt "creates an opportunity to use different procedures and
to impose different sanctions from those contemplated by the legislature under the circum-
stances").
251. Id. at 1273 (Tjofiat, J., concurring).
252. See id. at 1271-72 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (noting legislature determines criminal
conduct and punishment).
253. See id. at 1272 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (reinforcing legislature's prerogative).
254. See id. at 1276 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (describing defendant's procedural
protections).
255. See id. at 1270 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (noting legislature determines civil remedies).
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1994) (providing civil action for constitutional tort).
257. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) (imposing fine, imprisonment, or both for deprivation of
federal rights under color of law).
258. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1275 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concurring)




defendant to secure those rights of the plaintiff that otherwise are subject to
irreparable injury. The judge coerces the defendant to assure that the plaintiff
can enjoy those rights in fact. Coercive contempt is the form of contempt
unique to equity and related to the irreparable injury rule.
How would Judge Tjoflat's restated irreparable injury rule work in
practice? Let's return to Fatima EI-Erian and AMI. AMI's Commander
approves posting the Ten Commandments and student-led parade-ground
grace. Fatima El-Erian's complaint and motion alleges, "Plaintiff's rights
under the Establishment Clause having been impaired and damages being an
inadequate remedy, she will suffer irreparable injury without an injunction."
Because plaintiff Fatima EI-Erian seeks an injunction to protect her
Establishment Clause rights, the trial judge should look ahead to the injunc-
tion, to the defendant's breach, and to enforcement. If punishment for the
defendant's violation will be compensatory contempt or criminal contempt,
the judge should not grant the plaintiff an injunction. Instead the judge should
tell the plaintiff that if an Establishment Clause violation occurred, the plain-
tiff could sue the defendant under § 1983 seeking damages for a constitutional
tort.25 9 The Establishment Clause victim might also ask the United States
Attorney to prosecute the officials responsible for the observances as a
constitutional crime.26
The judge would deal with AMI's particular violations as follows. For
the Ten Commandments on AMI's mess hall door, the court's injunction
might say "Remove it." The judge reasons thus: "Suppose I grant an injunc-
tion ordering the Commander to 'remove' the Ten Commandments in three
days. If the Commander and other officials do not obey, I may use coercive
contempt, fines, or confinement until they do. So I can grant the plaintiff's
injunction."
What about AMI's parade-ground grace? Fatima El-Erian asks that the
court enjoin the Commander "from approving, ordering, or condoning student-
led prayers, grace, devotional messages, invocations, or benedictions at or
before meals or college-sponsored assemblies or events or over the public-
address system anywhere on AMI property."
An injunction might say "stop it" or "no more official parade ground
grace or prayer," and the judge might reason as follows:
Suppose I grant the injunction the plaintiff requests and the Commander,
by an official memo, approves and implements a program for a mandatory
mealtime pep rally on the parade ground before a lacrosse game that
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1994).
260. 18 U.S.C. §§ 24142 (2000).
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includes a prayer for an AMI victory over Washington and Lee. The
ceremony will violate the plaintiff's Establishment Clause right to be free
of official religious observances and the injunction. But since the harm
will have been done when the lacrosse captain's victory prayer ends, I
cannot coerce the defendant, only punish him or compensate the plaintiff.
Can the judge develop an intelligent coercive program in the event the defen-
dant violates that injunction? A wrongheaded approach would be to coerce
the recusant defendant to apologize or to promise to obey the injunction.26" '
The judge's responses to the defendant's violation would be limited to com-
pensatory contempt and criminal contempt. Therefore, the judge should tell
Fatima El-Erian, "I cannot grant you an injunction forbidding an official AMI
prayer on the parade ground. "
262
XV Criticism of Judge Tjoflat's Irreparable Injury Rule
Adoption of Judge Tjoflat's restated inadequacy prerequisite would be
a mistake. Several reasons follow.
First a recap: Judge Tjoflat evaluates whether damages are an adequate
remedy for the plaintiff by granting a hypothetical injunction and assuming
hypothetically that the defendant will violate the injunction. Then he evalu-
ates the hypothetical judge's contempt alternatives. Under Judge Tjoflat's
analysis, in deciding whether to enjoin, the judge should ask how to respond
if the court granted the plaintiff's injunction and if the defendant violated it.
When the judge, before enjoining, finds that if the defendant violates the
order, the judge can coerce him to obey it, then the judge may grant the
injunction. The judge should not grant an injunction that forbids the defen-
dant's conduct that, if violated by the defendant, leads to only compensation
or punishment. Judge Tjoflat says to use other government responses to
forbid the defendant's misconduct - damages actions and criminal prosecu-
tions.
Judge Tjoflat compares damages to contempt sanctions. He then bases
adequacy-inadequacy on a distinction between an injunction that commands
261. Fiss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 170, at 1026-28 (discussing examples of judicially
mandated apologies and noting inherent impracticability).
262. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concur-
ring) (stating that courts should not enforce prohibitory injunctions by compensatory or punitive
contempt sanctions). The present author changed Judge Tjoflat's graduation-prayer example
here because that may not be a substantive Establishment Clause violation at a college or
university. See Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding university's




conduct and one that forbids it, limiting the judge's ability to enjoin to an
injunction that commands conduct and that the court can enforce through
coercive contempt. Since federal courts now grant injunctions that they can
enforce only by compensatory contempt and criminal contempt, the major
effect of Judge Tjoflat's revised irreparable injury rule would be fewer
injunctions. 63 Restating the irreparable injury rule as a no-prohibitory-
injunctions rule would prevent judges from granting injunctions in numerous
Establishment Clause lawsuits and leave many constitutional and other
plaintiffs without an effective remedy.2"
Suppose, for example, that Commander Busby institutes a prayer led by
the instructor at the end of every class session. A senior cadet-plaintiff seeks
to enjoin the Establishment Clause violation on the day the Commander's
instructions call for it to begin, April 25, 2003, which is also her last day of
class before graduation. If the court granted this injunction and the Com-
mander breached it, the breach is once and for all, and the only forms of
contempt available would be compensatory contempt and criminal contempt,
for nothing exists to coerce. A plaintiff's constitutional rights are too precious
to let the violation occur. The judge should not decline to grant the plaintiff
an injunction, stand idly aside, watch the defendant invade the plaintiff's
Establishment Clause right, and expect that a jury will enter a damages
judgment.265 The Bill of Rights is not a list of occasions that trigger the
payment of money to victims.266
An Establishment Clause plaintiff will usually be thwarted in her attempt
to recover tort damages for an official religious observance. This Article
discusses three things above that undermine a plaintiff's opportunity to
recover damages as an adequate remedy for an Establishment Clause viola-
tion: a) a constitutional defendant's qualified immunity; b) the difficulty of
calculating damages for an Establishment Clause violation; and c) the possi-
bility of jury hostility to a plaintiff's Establishment Clause theory leading to
low or no damages.267
263. See En Banc Brief of Amicus Curiae Douglas Laycock at 26-27, Adler v. Duvall
County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (1 th Cir. 2001) (en bane), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief] (providing numerous examples of injunctions that would not be
granted).
264. See id. at 5 (recognizing "that violation of constitutional rights causes irreparable
injury").
265. See id. at 17 (quoting Declaration of Independence).
266. See FISS, supra note 2, at 75 (recognizing that civil rights deny "their reducibility to
a series of propositions assuring the payment of money to the victims").
267. See supra notes 46-70 and 88-97 and accompanying text (detailing how these
difficulties make money damages an inadequate remedy).
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An Establishment Clause plaintiffs criminal remedy is even more remote
from fruition. Will the federal prosecutor institute charges against AMI's
Commander for ordering a prayer on the parade ground? United States
Attorneys have more important business than criminal prosecutions of state
and local government officials for Establishment Clause violations. More-
over, the general constitutional criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242,26
do not give any kind of meaningful warning to an official. In unclear and
developing areas of the law like the Establishment Clause, the defendants
could usually avoid conviction under the criminal statutes because the law
under the religion clauses is almost never specified in a way that provides a
potential criminal defendant with "fair warning." For a criminal conviction
under the statutes, pre-existing law must establish that the defendant's conduct
is unlawful.269 A specific injunction would clarify the applicable substantive
law, identify the defendant, and spell out what conduct the defendant must
perform or avoid. This individualizes the law and warns the defendant enough
that, if he breaches, the judge should be able to employ compensatory con-
tempt or criminal contempt.
270
Assume for now a jury verdict granting compensatory damages to an
Establishment Clause plaintiff. Under the inadequacy test Professor Laycock
proposed, the court should ask whether the plaintiff could use the money from
this damages judgment to replace the specific interest encroached by the
defendant." If so, and only if so, damages are an adequate remedy for the
plaintiff. If not, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction. An Establishment
Clause plaintiff cannot use money to replace her lost constitutional right.
Professor Laycock's brief cited the Declaration of Independence as a precur-
sor of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to strengthen his argument
that constitutional rights are both "unalienable" and "inalienable. '"272 In more
268. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (2000).
269. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,266-67 (1997) (describing "manifestations
of fair warning requirement").
270. Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 24.
271. See id. at 3 (noting that "[t]he question is whether damages are adequate as compared
to an injunction that successfully preserves the plaintiff's rights").
272. Id. at 17. Laycock is using the Declaration of Independence's language and the
citation to invoke the ideological foundation for the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Even
though in 1776 the authors of the Declaration could not have predicted the Constitution and its
Bill of Rights that followed more than a decade later, his overarching argument is that the court
should not allow the defendant to wield the inadequacy prerequisite in a way that forces the
plaintiff to surrender her constitutional right in exchange for money because those rights are
priceless or too precious to transfer. The Declaration draft's "in-alienable" became "un-
alienable," my emphasis, in the final draft. Professor Pauline Maier says twice that the substitu-
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literal terms, if the plaintiff seeks an injunction, the court should forbid the
defendant from violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and converting
the plaintiff's right into a right to sue for damages. The judge should grant an
injunction as a preventive remedy.
Moreover, under the inadequacy doctrine, if the plaintiff's damages will
be difficult to calculate accurately, the court should view a preventive injunc-
tion favorably. This doctrine explains injunctions to forbid defendants'
misconduct that would lead to lost profits." 3 When the plaintiff claims an
Establishment Clause violation, determining what interests to compensate and
how to measure the loss have been baffling problems.2 4
Judge Tjoflat's irreparable injury rule test, which views inadequacy from
the perspective of the defendant's breach, creates arbitrary distinctions be-
tween enjoining and not enjoining. To enjoin AMI defendants to remove the
posted Ten Commandments, but to refuse to enjoin the parade-ground Estab-
lishment Clause violation,2" is a dysfunctional distinction without any basis
in the reality of the violations. Instead of positing an injunction-breach
hypothetical, the judge should analyze the plaintiff's request for an injunction
from the plaintiff's perspective. The better approach is to assume that the
defendant will obey an injunction and to compare that state of affairs, the
defendant's obedience, with damages, that is, with allowing the defendant to
violate the plaintiff's rights and awarding damages."'
Courts have both normative and practical reasons to assume a defen-
dant's obedience when examining inadequacy. Our system of government
through courts is based on the normative premise that defendants usually
respect courts and court orders. If the judge enjoins, that is a personalized
official statement that most people will obey. More down to earth, a defen-
dant's lawyer should advise him to obey, or at least warn him not to disobey,
an injunction.
2 77
tion of the prefix "un-" for the (today) more idiomatic "in-" happened during printing. PAULINE
MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKINo THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 144, 236 n. I
(Vintage ed. 1998).
273. LAYCOCK, supra note 103, at 44-47 (noting that injunctions are "routine remedy" for
various "kinds of unfair competition").
274. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text (discussing Warren Court's Establish-
ment Clause legacy).
275. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of ascertaining
nature of remedy for Establishment Clause violation).
276. See Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 18-19 (noting that comparing remedy with
sanctions for disobeying injunction has "no basis in the history of Anglo-American law").
277. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GoVEINo LAWYERS § 94(2) (2000) (providing,
inter alia, that "a lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
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If the foregoing policies are insufficient to induce a defendant to obey an
injunction, the threat of sanctions ought to play some role in structuring his
incentives. An injunction "freezes the defendant's conduct" more than a
possible action for damages.27 "When an injunction issues, the possible
severity of the penalty for disobedience renders the defendant's freedom of
choice virtually nonexistent." '279 The world is too complex and future events
are too unpredictable for the judge, when asked to grant an injunction, to be
able to predict the injunction, the defendant's violation, and the available
solutions.
A judge who seeks to protect a plaintiff's Establishment Clause rights
should assume that compensatory damages and criminal penalties are unrealis-
tic alternatives and concentrate on a plaintiff's rights, threatened as they are
alleged to be with irreparable injury. A judge should assume that the defen-
dant will obey an injunction; and the judge should ignore Judge Tjoflat's
advice to analyze a proposed injunction as if the defendant will violate it.
But can the defendant in fact violate the injunction and the plaintiff's
rights with it? "The injunction is not a set of handcuffs. In itself it cannot
prevent the defendant from doing the criminal act. 280 To change the analogy,
"[a]n injunction stops conduct only as well as a stop sign halts a car; the
defendant must apply the brakes and obey."28 Just because a judge cannot
enjoin to prevent every violation does not mean that he should not enjoin to
prevent most violations. Headstrong, stubborn, and desperate people will
inevitably violate injunctions and create the need for contempt sanctions.
Judge Tjoflat's proposed irreparable injury rule maintains that the judge
should grant the plaintiff an injunction only if the judge can use coercive
contempt to enforce it.282 He sets up the command-forbid distinction and
argues that the judge cannot use coercive contempt to enforce a "forbid"
injunction.2"3 A broader understanding of the ways a judge can phrase injunc-
be... in violation of a court order").
278. Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 153, at 1005.
279. Id.; see also Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 18 (noting universal assumption "that
injunctions will generally be obeyed").
280. Charles Wright, The Law ofRemedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L. J. 376,
391 n.65 (1955).
281. Rendleman, supra note 150, at 357.
282. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1266 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., concurring)
(concluding that "a court should not enter an injunction that cannot be enforced through
coercive contempt sanctions").
283. See id. at 1268-69 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (posing hypothetical and noting after party
violates injunction "[c]oercive sanctions ... are not available because the act to be prevented
by the injunction has already occurred").
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tions and use coercive contempt leads to different conclusions about the
relationship between injunctions and coercive contempt. Courts can phrase
some injunctions more broadly. For example, the court could rephrase an
injunction forbidding improper religious observances after an April 25 class
to prevent violations after all future classes. If the defendant's breach may
recur or continue, the judge has at least five coercive options.284 These include
exhortations to obey, second injunctions called contempt to cease continuing
violations, coerced promises to obey, deadlines for obedience, and orders to
correct the breach.285 The judge may displace the defendant as a decision
maker by appointing a receiver or monitor. 86 Since the judge has already
found money damages to be inadequate, his goal is to "coerce" and thereby
assure that the plaintiff enjoys the right in fact, instead of a money substitute.
There are at least three refinements to the foregoing options. First,
coercing a defendant to promise to obey often does not work well; a long-term
example of the futility of this technique involves Randall Terry of Operation
Rescue.287 Second, when a court specifies or announces future sanctions,
uniform or escalating, it imposes a form of coercive contempt because the
defendant must comply to avoid the sanction. However, when the judge
imposes those previously announced sanctions after the defendant's breach,
that fixed sanction for past misconduct requires criminal procedure.288 Be-
cause the court may avoid the possible problems relating to the transmogrifica-
tion from coercive contempt to criminal contempt by paying careful attention
to procedure, this distinction is unrelated to the command-forbid distinction.
Third, some injunctions and some breaches are once-for-all. Examples
include: "do not pray at the 2002 graduation; '289 "do not parade on Good
Friday;"'290 and "do not cut the red maple tree on your property line." After the
defendant violates a once-for-all injunction, the metaphorical bell has rung.
284. See FISS & RENDLEMAN, supra note 170, at 1007 (listing options and providing
examples); see also Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 19-20 (recognizing five options).
285. See Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 19-20 (recognizing five options).
286. See id. at 20 (noting this is option "if defiance is persistent").
287. See N.Y. State N.O.W. v. Terry, 159 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting original
action for injunctive relief filed ten years earlier).
288. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-39 (1994)
(concluding that when contempt sanction is punitive, rather than remedial, it acts as criminal
punishment and cannot be imposed without constitutional protections that accompany criminal
proceedings); see also Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 21-22 (discussing requirement of
criminal procedure when penalties shift from coercive to criminal contempt).
289. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (affirming court of appeals' injunction
against prayer at graduation as violation of Establishment Clause).
290. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 309 (1967) (considering injunction
prohibiting street parades or processions).
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The judge cannot wield coercive contempt to "unring" it. The judge has no
tools left but compensatory contempt and criminal contempt.
The judge should grant the plaintiff an injunction even when the defen-
dant's violation may be "once-for-all," and he may not be able to use coercive
contempt to enforce it. If the court declines to grant a "forbid" injunction, it
undermines the idea that the plaintiff's damages remedy is inadequate because
it lets the defendant convert the plaintiff's right to the defendant's conduct
into a right to recover money. As outlined above, most defendants obey
injunctions. The first thing for the judge to consider, however, is whether the
court can draft an injunction more appropriately to preserve the option to
coerce. If any coercive contempt occurs, the judge should consider using
coercive techniques to protect the plaintiff's actual substantive right. For
these techniques to work, the court must impose coercive sanctions that are
more onerous to the defendant than future compensatory contempt or criminal
contempt would be.29'
Finally, the present author argued a few years ago that, if compensatory
contempt is necessary, the judge should measure it to advance the idea that
money is an inadequate remedy.2' Before enjoining, the judge found that
money was inadequate. The defendant can violate an injunction and convert
the plaintiff's irreparable right into a cause of action for compensatory con-
tempt. By breaching, the defendant has remitted the plaintiff to that inade-
quate remedy because it is too late for the plaintiff to enjoy the substantive
right. In measuring compensatory contempt, the judge should vindicate the
substantive standard underlying the injunction by using that standard's dam-
ages measurement formula. In addition, the judge should vindicate the
irreparable injury rule by awarding the plaintiff her cost to enforce the injunc-
tion which includes her attorney's fees.293 The judge should make compensa-
tory contempt as costless to the plaintiff as possible by adding attorney's fees
to the plaintiff's recovery from the defendant's violation; the purpose of the
attorney's fee recovery is to facilitate the plaintiff's enforcement and to
vindicate as nearly as possible the plaintiff's right to avoid irreparable
injury.2" The judge should also be able to use criminal contempt for breaches
291. See Flss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 170, at 1006 (noting that coercive contempt
should make it more economical for contemnor to comply than to continue with contempt).
292. Rendleman, supra note 231, at 972-74 (1980).
293. See id. at 998-1002 (explaining that cost of enforcing injunction with contempt order
is recognized exception to usual rule that courts will not allow prevailing litigants to recover
attorney's fees).
294. See id. at 985-86, 997-1003 (explaining that allowing successful plaintiff to recover
enforcement costs advances policies underlying decision to enjoin).
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of non-coercible injunctions to punish the recusant defendant and to deter
other similar breaches.295
Judge Tjoflat seeks perfection: to limit injunctions to those orders that
let the judge use coercive contempt to secure the plaintiff s rights in fact. The
position taken here accepts a certain amount of imperfection. The plaintiff's
damages remedy is inadequate even if the judge cannot use coercive con-
tempt; compensatory contempt simply converts the plaintiff's right to the
defendant's conduct back into a right to money.
Judge Tjoflat is idealistic about judicial power. He seeks to ration
judicial power - to limit the judge's injunction power to instances with a high
probability of success and to decline to enjoin when the defendant may be
able to thwart the judge. His technique is to enjoin only when, after the
defendant's violation, the judge may still coerce the defendant to respect the
plaintiffs rights and to shunt many disappointed plaintiffs to the usual civil
and criminal courts. This proposed solution, however, leads to two kinds of
problems. First, Judge Tjoflat endorses a troublesome form of injunction.
Second, the judge cannot always coerce the defendant to obey.
Judge Tjoflat's restated irreparable injury rule requires judges to grant
a "do it" injunction and to decline to grant a "don't do it" injunction. Al-
though he phrases it differently, Judge Tjoflat is invoking the distinction
discussed in decisions and the literature between "do it" "mandatory" and
"don't do it" "prohibitory" injunctions. Another way to state the distinction
is that the injunctions Judge Tjoflat prefers will alter the status quo, while the
ones he disapproves will preserve it.2"
Legal scholarship and court opinions usually raise the mandatory-prohib-
itory injunction distinction while pointing to the drawbacks of mandatory
injunctions. Courts have held that a plaintiff must demonstrate a stronger
need before a court will enter mandatory interlocutory relief, an injunction
that changes the status quo and requires affirmative conduct.297 Courts have
historically favored "don't" or prohibitory injunctions and disfavored "do" or
mandatory injunctions because prohibitory injunctions are "easier [for a
295. Cf Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 23 (concluding that despite need for criminal
procedure, court still has power to issue and enforce injunctions).
296. Judge Tjoflat reduces the distinction somewhat by proposing that the judge may, for
example, desegregate the school by ordering the authorities to formulate a plan for a unitary
school and then to implement the plan. Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1273 (11th Cir.
1999) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
297. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 153, at 1061 (reviewing courts'
historical reluctance to issue mandatory affirmative injunctions). See generally Lee, supra note
188 (disagreeing with any trend to raise preliminary injunction standard for mandatory orders).
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defendant] to obey and easier [for a judge] to enforce.""29 A court with a
sense of alacrity to implement a plaintiff's right under substantive law will
employ either a mandatory or a negative order. Judge Tjoflat's approval of
only the hardest kind of order, a coercible or mandatory injunction, reverses
the courts' usual inclination for forbidding rather than ordering conduct and
creates difficulty for trial judges charged with securing obedience to law.299
Judge Tjoflat's idea that a judge should grant an injunction only when he
can employ coercive contempt encounters the reality that coercive contempt
does not always succeed. With coercive contempt the judge keeps the prom-
ise he made when he found damages were inadequate. He maintains that the
plaintiffs substantive interest is important enough to protect in fact. But
coercive contempt may be ineffective and may not suffice to keep the promise.
The judge cannot successfully coerce a terminally stubborn defendant. Even
though the judge may coerce by confining the contemnor, a recalcitrant
contemnor may refuse to obey long enough to defeat coercive contempt, and
will thwart the plaintiff s rights. When the judge realizes further confinement
cannot coerce the contemnor, the judge should order his release.3" Judge
Tjoflat's reliance on coercive contempt fails to contend with a terminally
stubborn defendant.
Remedies is a pragmatic science. The court usually starts with a plaintiff
in an imperfect world, one marred by the defendant's violation. Often within
the world of the second-best, the judge needs as many options as possible -
positive and negative injunctions. Because injunctions will not always secure
the plaintiffs rights, the judge also needs compensatory contempt, coercive
contempt, and criminal contempt. "It is best," Professor Richard Epstein
298. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, J.).
299. See Amicus Brief, supra note 263, at 27 (discussing historical presumption in favor
of prohibiting injunctions); see also Developments in the Law-Injunctions, supra note 153, at
1061-63 (discussing reluctance of courts to impose mandatory injunctions in all but the
strongest cases). Positive statements of negative orders create problems of their own. To begin
with, the band may tune up but never start to play. What does the judge say about the defen-
dant's fifth unsatisfactory plan? Should the judge say, "Go to jail until you have a satisfactory
plan"? A wise judge will avoid making a martyr out of the a defendant, particularly a federal
judge dealing with a state or local government official. If Judge Tjoflat's restated irreparable
injury test does not thwart federal injunctions completely, administering it will be cumbersome
and confusing.
300. Rendleman, supra note 175, at 190-200 (explaining that once coercive confinement
loses its power to coerce, the courts must release the uncoercable person to prevent the transfor-
mation of confinement into criminal punishment). But see Chadwick v. Janecka, 302 F.3d 107,




observed, "to avoid the mistake of thinking that nothing can be solved unless
everything is solved."3 1
Finally, a recalibrated irreparable injury rule would impair the federal
court's institutional role of protecting federal constitutional and other federally
protected rights. 2 Judge Tjoflat's redefined irreparable injury rule would
structure a constitutional plaintiff's incentives to sue in state courts, often with
elected judges. The state court must hear a plaintiff s federal constitutional
theory.30 3 However, an elected or unsympathetic state judge could impose
delay or error cost on an Establishment Clause plaintiff, who would then have
to wend her way through the state system and secure plenary review from the
United States Supreme Court. 4
A plaintiff litigating to protect a substantive right under exclusive federal
jurisdiction, copyright for example, would lack the constitutional plaintiff's
option of suing in state court.3 .5 Copyright litigation would continue in federal
courts under the regimen of a revised irreparable injury rule, where the reduced
role of injunctions would undermine copyright owners' rights. Many compen-
satory contempt decisions involve copyright and patent proprietors' intellec-
tual property rights which are under exclusive federal jurisdiction; forbidding
federal judges from granting them injunctions would effectively remit them to
second federal damages actions which would reduce the value of their property
interests by making it always cumbersome and sometimes impossible for them
to sue infringers to enforce their rights meaningfully.
30 6
XV. Conclusion
Fatima E1-Erian's possible remedies for AMI's officially imposed religion
are compensatory damages and an injunction. Large damages seem out of her
reach. Fatima should be entitled to an injunction to protect her from an im-
proper establishment of religion.
The irreparable injury rule has not been an impediment or a menace to
plaintiffs in constitutional litigation. However, the irreparable injury rule
301. RicHaRD A. EPSTEiN, SuMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WoRLD 331 (1995).
302. See supra note 105 (discussing increased receptiveness to constitutional claims at
federal level).
303. See Hathom v. Lovom, 457 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1982) (concluding that when party to
state proceeding claims that contemplated relief is unenforceable, state court must examine
claim and refrain from ordering relief that violates federal law), reh 'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131
(1982).
304. Supra note 104.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970).
306. See Rendleman, supra note 231, at 972 n.5, 1001 (discussing compensatory contempt
cases that have grown out of injunctions to protect copyright and patent interests).
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restated by Judge Tjoflat would mean no injunction or only a partial injunction
for Fatima and any other plaintiff seeking to protect a right to be free from an
establishment of religion. Thus, other courts should eschew Judge Tjoflat's
suggested alteration of the irreparable injury rule.
The Problem judge's proper analysis under the present irreparable injury
rule is straightforward. Has the AMI Commander violated, or is he about to
violate, plaintiff Fatima EI-Erian's constitutional liberty to be free of an
improper establishment of religion? Has the plaintiff sought an injunction?
The judge ought to overlook the irreparable injury rule-inadequacy prerequi-
site except, perhaps, to "check the box" before granting her an interlocutory
injunction. The judge ought not allow a defendant to thwart the plaintiff's
Establishment Clause rights and pay her money damages, if indeed money
damages are possible or feasible. This is because money damages would
transmogrify the plaintiff's constitutional right to be free of officially sanc-
tioned religious observances in fact into a right the defendant can invade and
convert into an inferior and often illusory right to money. The judge in the
Problem should grant the plaintiff E1-Erian an injunction forbidding the
defendants from officially sanctioned religious activity that violates her
Establishment Clause rights.
After rebutting Judge Tjoflat's proposal to reconstruct the inadequacy
prerequisite and then using the unreconstructed irreparable injury rule to
resolve the AMI Problem, I will close this Article with two loftier conclusions.
First, any modification in the inadequacy prerequisite-irreparable injury rule
should be in the opposite direction than the one suggested by Judge Tjoflat.
I commend to the courts, Congress, and the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
to consider ways to reduce or eliminate the remedial hierarchy that may
subordinate an injunction to other remedies."
Second, the preservation of minority rights under law is the Warren
Court's broadest and most enduring legacy. Alone among the civil remedies,
an injunction will shield a citizen's rights and liberties in fact. An injunction
concentrates judicial power and endows a court with the unique ability to
articulate constitutional values even as it protects minority rights. May my
modest effort remind the profession that the injunction is indispensable to
government under the Constitution.
307. See FisS, supra note 2, at 86-95 (explaining that courts should move to non-hierarchi-
cal conception of remedies and choose appropriate remedies based on their technical advantages
rather than on generalized propositions about which remedies are favored); LAYCOCK, supra
note 103, at 276-78 (proposing statute to abolish irreparable injury rule); Rendleman, supra
note 38, at 1665-67 (proposing reform of irreparable injury rule through amendment of
procedural rules).
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